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Network neutrality issues have been vigorously debated worldwide over the past few 
years. One major aim of network neutrality proponents is to prevent high-speed Internet 
service providers from charging content providers for priority delivery. Recently, 
proponents have turned their attention to the regulation of wireless networks, such as 
those for cellular phones, which provide increasing numbers of consumers access to 
Internet services. Some application providers have relied on a recent academic paper to 
support greater regulation of wireless operators.  Although the proposals to regulate 
these networks use the phrase “net neutrality,” the regulations they seek to impose on 
wireless operators have little in common with those being sought for other Internet 
service providers. In this article, we provide a framework for determining whether 
certain kinds of regulations should be imposed on the owners of wireless networks. We 
also consider the benefits and costs of specific proposals for the regulation of these 
networks. Our principal conclusion is that the costs of most of these proposals are likely 
to exceed the benefits. 
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“Network neutrality” has become a shorthand description of a policy that 
would regulate how network providers design, manage, and price the use of their 
networks. Depending upon the industry in which it is applied, however, the net 
neutrality concept has taken different forms. In the wireline context, net 
neutrality regulation primarily seeks to prevent a high-speed Internet service 
provider, such as a cable modem provider or a DSL provider, from charging a fee 
for enhanced quality of service to content providers. By contrast, requests for 
“wireless net neutrality” regulation primarily seek to prevent a wireless operator 
from imposing certain limitations on equipment manufacturers and application     
 




providers. They also seek to prevent wireless operators from imposing usage 
limits on end-users.  
Net neutrality regulation is important from a policy perspective because it is 
likely to have a significant effect on the development and use of future wireline 
and wireless broadband networks. In particular, broadband operators face 
capacity problems as the demand for bandwidth-intensive applications, such as 
streaming videos and online games, accelerates. Network operators have limited 
options for addressing this demand, including rationing existing capacity in the 
short term, and building more capacity and more intelligent networks over the 
long term. If network neutrality regulations are implemented, it could have a 
dramatic effect on the future of the Internet, which may help to explain why the 
issue has received a great deal of attention from scholars and the broader policy 
community. 
Scholars have offered up a diverse range of views on the subject of net 
neutrality, with some supporting regulation
1 and some opposing it.
2 Most 
scholarship until now has focused on the merits of different approaches for 
regulating wireline broadband operators. In this paper, we address recent 
regulatory efforts to subject U.S. wireless operators to net neutrality regulation. 
We provide an economic framework for analyzing whether specific practices 
identified by proponents of wireless net neutrality should be regulated. We 
identify and estimate the likely costs and benefits of preventing wireless 
operators from imposing certain limitations on suppliers and end-users that are 
alleged to be anticompetitive.  
To make matters concrete, consider the following practice of one wireless 
operator, Verizon Wireless, as of March 2007. If a Verizon Wireless subscriber 
                                                      
1.  Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the 
Quest for a Balanced Policy, Carnegie Mellon University Working Paper, Sept, 2006; 
Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias? Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and 
Branded Internet, Pennsylvania State University Working Paper, Sept. 2006; Barbara van 
Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, Journal 
of Telecommunications and High Tech Law (forthcoming 2007). 
2.  See,  e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of 
Congestion, 94 GEORGETOWN LAW J. 1847 (2006); Bruce Owen, The Net Neutrality 
Debate: Twenty Five Years after United States v. AT&T and 120 Years after the Act to 
Regulate Commerce, AEI Brookings Joint Center Working Paper 07-03, Feb. 2007; 
Alfred E. Kahn, Network Neutrality, AEI Brookings Joint Center Related Publication 07-
05, Mar 2007; J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality 
Regulation of the Internet, 2 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION  LAW  &  ECONOMICS  (2006); 
Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, The Myth of Network Neutrality and What We Should 
Do About It, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. RP06-33 (Nov. 2006); 
Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer, The Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality, 5 
JOURNAL ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND HIGH TECH LAW (forthcoming 2007); Hal J. 
Singer,  Net Neutrality: A Radical Form of Non-Discrimination, REGULATION 
(forthcoming 2007); William J. Baumol, Martin E. Cave, Peter Cramton, Robert W. 
Hahn, Thomas W. Hazlett, Paul L. Joskow, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert E. Litan, John W. 
Mayo, Patrick A. Messerlin, Bruce Owen, Robert S. Pindyck, Vernon Smith, Scott J. 
Wallsten, Leonard Waverman & Lawrence J. White, Economists’ Statement on Network 
Neutrality Policy, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. RP07-08, Mar. 28, 
2007. 
    
 




commits to a two-year contract, then the price of her LG Strawberry Chocolate 
handset is $99.99; if she commits to a one-year contract only, then the price of 
the same handset increases to $199.99; if she does not commit to a contract, then 
the price increases to $269.99.
3 According to proponents of wireless net 
neutrality, this practice “distorts” the market for wireless handsets.
4 Using an 
economic framework, we can examine whether such a strategy is likely to lead to 
higher prices of handsets for end-users in the long-run, or whether there is some 
efficiency justification that explains the practice. 
The intellectual support for wireless net neutrality regulation is provided in a 
provocative paper by Professor Tim Wu.
5 Wu’s paper seeks to identify carrier 
practices that may be harmful to consumers. Wu cites several restrictions that 
wireless operators have imposed on their customers or suppliers, including a 
requirement that all handsets be sold by the wireless operator. Economists refer 
to such restrictions as “vertical restraints.” There is a large literature on the 
economic impacts of such restraints. In some cases such restraints can reduce 
economic welfare, while in others they increase economic welfare.
6 Most, but not 
all, of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct identified by Wu can be 
characterized as a vertical restraint.
7  
To appreciate the controversy raised by proponents of wireless net neutrality, 
one needs a basic understanding of the structure of the wireless market. Consider, 
for example, the relationship between an applications provider and a wireless 
customer. Because the transaction between those two entities flows over the 
network of a wireless operator, the operator can be thought of as the 
“downstream” provider—that is, the entity that interfaces with the customer. The 
                                                      
3.    Id.  
4.  In the Matter of Skype Communications S.A.R.L. Petition to Confirm A 
Consumer’s Right to Use Internet Communications Software and Attach Devices to 
Wireless Networks, Dkt. No. RM-11361, Feb. 20, 2007, at 13 [hereinafter Skype Petition] 
(“For the vast majority of U.S. wireless consumers, carriers sell phones that are highly 
subsidized and mask the true cost of the device. Consequently, the market for wireless 
devices is unusual and distorted. This market distortion is of increasing concern as 
handsets become more versatile and are used to access a broader array of functions and 
services.”) (citation omitted). 
5.  See Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone on Mobile Networks, 
New America Foundation Wireless Future Program Working Paper No. 17, Feb. 2007, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962027&high=%20 
net%20neutrality. By March 11, 2006, a little over one month after its initial posting, 
Wu’s paper had been downloaded over 1,700 times, making it the second most popular 
paper among all SSRN postings between January 10, 2007 and March 11, 2007. By April 
2, 2007, the paper had been downloaded 1,961 times. See Skype Petition at 12 n.21, 13 
n.22 (citing Wu). 
6.  We define economic welfare as the sum of producer surplus and consumer 
surplus. Profits are a good proxy for producer surplus. Consumer welfare is equal to the 
difference between a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good and the price summed 
across all consumers. Economists may disagree on whether regulatory policy should 
focus on consumer surplus only. We focus on consumer surplus here because that seems 
to be a concern of Wu.   
7.  Wu identifies some other practices that he also finds objectionable, such as 
failing to disclose key information to consumers. These other practices are considered 
here as well.      
 




applications provider is referred to as the “upstream” provider because it is 
removed from the end-user. The wireless operator may have the ability to impose 
certain restraints on the behavior of upstream suppliers as a condition for gaining 
access to the operator’s customers. 
Some upstream applications suppliers have relied on the Wu paper to support 
an agenda of greater regulation of wireless operators. Shortly after Wu’s initial 
paper was released, Skype, a voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) provider that 
generally relies on wireline broadband networks, filed a petition at the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) asking the agency to “confirm a 
consumer’s right to use Internet communications software and attach devices to 
wireless networks.”
8 The petition alleges that wireless operators are engaging in 
restrictive practices at both the “device layer”—at the point of handset 
purchase—and the “application layer”—at the point of installing applications on 
their chosen handset—that are harming consumers. The petition requests that the 
FCC should apply a Carterfone-style rule to wireless networks
9—a rule imposed 
by the FCC in 1968 that required AT&T to allow devices to be connected 
directly to the AT&T wireline network so long as they did not cause damage to 
the network. Skype also asks the FCC to “initiate a proceeding to evaluate 
wireless carrier practices in light of Carterfone, and to create an industry-led 
mechanism to ensure the openness of wireless networks.”
10 In this paper, we also 
provide an economic analysis of the Skype petition. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Part II, we provide an analytical 
framework for determining whether government intervention, both generally and 
of the particular kind sought here, is warranted in the U.S. wireless industry. We 
lay out four general principles for regulatory intervention:  
 
(1)  There should be clear evidence of a significant market failure;  
(2)  There should be clear evidence that the proposed intervention is likely to be 
better than the status quo;  
(3)  The intervention should take into account all important benefits and costs; and  
(4)  The proposal should draw constructive lessons from earlier attempts at 
regulation. 
 
In the absence of direct or indirect evidence of a market failure, it is 
generally not prudent to interfere with a well-functioning market.
11 We 
demonstrate here that there is a high degree of competition in the wireless 
industry, and thus little reason to believe that there is a significant market failure. 
According to the FCC, the price of a wireless call, as measured by the revenue 
per minute for the operator or cost per minute from the end-user, declined from 
$0.43 in 1995 to $0.07 in 2005.
12  
                                                      
8.  Skype Petition at 1. 
9.  Id. at 25-28. 
10.  Id. at 28-30. 
11.  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al, Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221-222 (1996) 
12. FCC, Eleventh Annual Report to Congress on the State of Competition in the 
Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) Industry, WT Dkt. No. 06-17, released 
Sept. 29, 2006, Appendix A Table 10 [hereinafter Eleventh CMRS Report]. The 
numerator in the average price per minute is average revenue per subscriber, which is    
 




We also demonstrate that the proponents of wireless net neutrality have 
failed to specify a clear benchmark (or counterfactual) from which to judge 
success. Notwithstanding Wu’s assertion to the contrary, we demonstrate that 
U.S. wireless customers enjoy great diversity in their wireless telephones. 
Moreover, innovation at the application level is thriving. A survey of FCC 
competition reports and the operators’ websites reveals that there have been more 
than 50 significant innovations in wireless applications since 1999. A separate 
review of the operators’ websites reveals that there are more than 150 unique 
models of handsets directly available from the five largest operators. It is 
incumbent on proponents of regulation to explain why that seemingly high level 
of product diversity is not adequate. 
Next, we specifically examine the costs and benefits of Wu’s proposal to 
prevent wireless operators from imposing certain restraints on upstream 
suppliers.
13 We demonstrate that banning these restraints would not likely 
generate significant benefits for consumers. The reason is that the market 
structure of the U.S. wireless industry is simply not conducive to engaging in 
anticompetitive strategies aimed at weakening upstream equipment or 
applications providers. Moreover, the wireless market is constantly evolving, 
which makes regulation even less likely to achieve its objective. We also explain 
why allowing wireless operators to impose certain limitations on both suppliers 
and end-users would preserve significant efficiencies that redound to the benefit 
of wireless consumers. Common limitations imposed by wireless carriers include 
offering discounts on handsets in exchange for term commitments, using 
exclusive distribution agreements between operators and handset makers, and 
imposing limits on foreign attachments or the type of content downloaded. We 
demonstrate clear efficiency justifications for each of these limitations. In 
particular, these strategies can be shown to (1) encourage wireless operators to 
promote handsets aggressively, (2) permit the wireless operator to discount the 
price of the handset, (3) ensure a high quality of service for wireless customers, 
or (4) enable the wireless operator to manage a scarce resource. Regarding other 
practices identified by Wu, such as requiring that a handset be sold by the 
operator or disabling certain features of the handset, we find that those strategies 
are  generally not employed by wireless operators. Where a network operator 
vigorously polices usage by its customers, the quality of service and thus 
customer satisfaction tend to be higher. We find that the network that engages in 
the “worst practices” identified by Wu ranks highest according to customer 
satisfaction surveys. Given the high level of competition in the wireless industry, 
an individual operator should be entitled to experiment with different business 
models, especially where there is unlikely to be any anticompetitive effect.  
In Part III, we address specific problems in Wu’s analysis and Skype’s 
proposal to apply Carterfone rules to the wireless industry. We explain that, for 
at least four reasons, the market and regulatory conditions that potentially 
                                                                                                                                    
collected by CTIA. These values are given in nominal terms rather than real terms. The 
FCC shows that the “Cellular CPI,” as recorded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
declined by 35 percent from December 1997 to December 2005. See id. at Appendix A 
Table 9. Thus, cellular prices have declined in real terms. 
13. Skype basically proposes Wu’s policies in its FCC petition. Thus, our analysis 
of Skype’s proposal would be no different from our analysis of Wu’s proposal.     
 




justified Carterfone regulation in the late 1960s do not exist in the current U.S. 
wireless industry. First, unlike AT&T’s control of the supply of wireline voice 
services nearly forty years ago, U.S. wireless operators today lack monopoly 
power in the downstream market for wireless services. Second, unlike wireline 
voice services in the 1960s, U.S. wireless operators have not integrated into the 
upstream applications or equipment markets. Third, a wireless operator lacks the 
ability to exercise buying power over an upstream handset supplier like Apple, 
which wields significant countervailing seller power. Fourth, wireless operators 
are not subject to price regulation in the market in which they are alleged to have 
market power, which might encourage them to seek profits in complementary 
markets. 
Wu asserts that several “obvious” wireless applications seem to be missing, 
such as uploading photos or printing address labels. Wu cannot, however, reject 
the hypothesis that certain applications are not offered by wireless operators 
because they are not in sufficient demand. The power of well-functioning 
markets ensures that consumer needs that are not currently met will likely soon 
be addressed. As of 2007, a Blackberry could do many things a laptop could not 
and vice versa. If a laptop maker could shrink its device to the size of a 
Blackberry, it would. Likewise, if a Blackberry could perform all of the 
applications of a laptop, it would. The fact that a Blackberry cannot perform a 
certain function today is not evidence of a conspiracy among wireless operators. 
If that function is demanded by a sufficient number of wireless subscribers, it is 
likely to be available on the next generation of wireless handsets. 
Next, we explain why exclusive contracts between wireless operators and 
content providers are unlikely to harm consumers in the wireless market. In 
particular, the type of content that has become exclusive to a particular wireless 
operator, such as an online music library, is generally interchangeable with a 
music library carried by a rival operator. This stands in sharp contrast to certain 
exclusive contracts used by video distributors—for example, an exclusive 
agreement to carry National Football League games. Such exclusive content 
cannot be replicated by a rival distributor, which means that the end-user may be 
forced in the case of video service (but not wireless services) to purchase 
multiple subscriptions to access exclusive, non-replicable content on two 
different systems. 
In Part IV, we explain why Wu’s proposed remedies do not flow from his 
theory of competitive harm. In particular, Wu makes four major policy 
recommendations:  
 
(1)  Wireless operators should be compelled to allow customers to attach any safe 
device to their wireless handsets;  
(2)  Wireless operators should be compelled to allow customers to use the 
applications of their choice and view the content of their choice;  
(3)  Wireless operators should be compelled to disclose any limits placed on devices 
and on bandwidth usage;  
(4)  The wireless industry should work together to create clear and unified standards 
for developers.  
 
We assess each of these recommendations in turn. We conclude that the best 
policy for the U.S. wireless industry is maintaining the current light-handed 
approach to regulation, which generated by our estimates roughly $50 billion in    
 




consumer welfare in 2005 alone.
14 Additional government regulation of the 
wireless market could put these substantial consumer benefits at risk. 
 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING WHETHER GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
IS WARRANTED IN THE U.S. WIRELESS INDUSTRY 
A dynamic market is one in which technology is constantly changing, where 
today’s market leader can be upstaged by an unforeseen competitor or 
technology. In dynamically competitive markets, such as the U.S. wireless 
industry, the government should be very reluctant to regulate.
15 The problem for 
regulators is that dynamic incentives to invest are important to wireless operators. 
Inefficient regulation threatens to jeopardize the investment needed to upgrade 
the existing third generation (3G) wireless platform to support broadband 
services and to launch the fourth generation (4G) network to support real-time 
applications such as mobile video, remote monitoring, and mobile commerce. 
Indeed, regulation in network industries generally and in the wireless industry in 
particular does not have a very positive history.
16 In this section, we provide 
some general principles for regulatory intervention of any kind in the U.S. 
wireless industry. We demonstrate that the costs that would result from banning 
certain limitations currently imposed by wireless operators would likely exceed 
the benefits created by allowing those limitations. 
A.  General Principles for Regulatory Intervention in the U.S. Wireless Industry 
When considering regulatory intervention of any kind, at least four 
overarching principles should be considered. We outline these principles below, 
and then apply each principle to the U.S. wireless industry. Our approach does 
not rule out all forms of regulation in the wireless industry. For example, it is 
conceivable that certain wireless applications with positive externalities or 
spillovers might be undersupplied by the market. The key issue here, however, is 
                                                      
14. Consumer welfare is equal to the area under the demand curve bounded from 
below by price. Assuming linear demand, that area is equal to one half the product of the 
quantity of wireless subscriptions and the difference between the average monthly price 
and the monthly “choke price” or price at which the demand for wireless service would 
be zero. For example, using an elasticity of demand of -1.2, an average monthly price of 
roughly $50, and 213 million wireless subscribers, the monthly choke price for wireless 
service is roughly $91. Thus, the monthly consumer welfare is roughly $4.4 billion and 
the annual consumer welfare is roughly $53.2 billion. For an estimate of the elasticity of 
demand for wireless service, see Allan T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, Do States Tax 
Wireless Services Inefficiently? Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Demand, 24 VIRG. 
TAX REV. 249, 257 (2004) (generating estimates of -1.12 and -1.29). For average monthly 
prices and total number of wireless subscribers, see Eleventh CRMS Report, supra note 
12, ¶¶5, 155. 
15.  See,  e.g., Dennis Carlton, Antitrust Policy Toward Mergers When Firms 
Innovate: Should Antitrust Recognize the Doctrine of Innovation Markets?, Testimony 
before the Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Global and Innovation-based 
Competition (Oct. 1995). 
16.  See, e.g., Bruce Owen, The Net Neutrality Debate: Twenty Five Years after 
United States v. AT&T and 120 Years after the Act to Regulate Commerce, AEI 
Brookings Joint Center Working Paper 07-03, Feb. 2007.     
 




whether proposals to implement wireless net neutrality make good economic 
sense. 
1.  There Should Be Clear Evidence of a Significant Market Failure  
Markets generally can be counted on to allocate resources efficiently and to 
ensure that goods and services are supplied at the lowest cost possible.
17 In the 
presence of externalities (benefits or costs that cannot be fully captured by the 
parties to a transaction), however, markets may fail by providing too much (in 
the case of negative externalities) or too little (in the case of positive 
externalities) of a good. There are externalities in network industries like 
communications services,
18 which implies that the market-determined size of a 
network might be less than the socially optimal level. The existence of positive 
externalities has been used to justify subsidies for customers living in high-cost 
areas, which increase the number of subscribers to the network and thereby 
generate benefits for existing subscribers. To the extent that these externalities 
are significant, they would not be addressed by any of the proposed remedies 
sought by proponents of wireless net neutrality.
19  
Proponents of any regulation must first demonstrate the existence of a 
significant failure in the wireless market. Direct evidence of a market failure 
could include proof that (1) prices are significantly above or below the relevant 
measure of costs, or (2) output is significantly above or below socially efficient 
levels. Economists often subscribe to a version of the Hippocratic oath—first, do 
no harm. In the absence of large positive externalities or high entry barriers, they 
believe that markets generally do a pretty good job in allocating resources. 
Although Wu is concerned about innovation in the upstream applications 
market, he provides no quantitative evidence of a particular market failure in the 
U.S. wireless industry. In particular, he provides no direct evidence (for example, 
output being significantly below efficient levels) and no indirect evidence (for 
example, the existence of strong positive externalities or high entry barriers). We 
believe that such a demonstration is difficult precisely because of the robust 
competition among U.S. wireless operators.  
By almost any measure, the U.S. wireless market is highly competitive. 
Consumer choices are expanding and prices are declining. In its series of annual 
Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) Competition Reports, the FCC has 
documented the concurrent increase in wireless usage and decrease in wireless 
prices over the past decade. Table 1 summarizes these statistics from 1993 
through 2005. 
 
                                                      
17. Of course, there are other important concerns, such as equity. We do not 
consider such concerns in the interest of brevity, though they can be important in selected 
instances.  
18.  See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE 
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY, Harvard Business School Press (1999).   
19. Even where positive externalities exist, it may be difficult to implement 
regulation or subsidies that improve on the status quo.     
 




TABLE 1: WIRELESS TELEPHONY PRICES AND USAGE 1993-2005 
  Average Monthly  
Wireless Bill (A) 
Average Minutes of 
Use Per Month (B) 
Average Revenue Per 
Minute (A / B) 
1993 $61.49  140  $0.44 
1994 $56.21  119  $0.47 
1995 $51.00  119  $0.43 
1996 $47.70  125  $0.38 
1997 $42.78  117  $0.37 
1998 $39.43  136  $0.29 
1999 $41.24  185  $0.22 
2000 $45.27  255  $0.18 
2001 $47.37  380  $0.12 
2002 $48.40  427  $0.11 
2003 $49.91  507  $0.10 
2004 $50.64  584  $0.09 
2005 $49.98  740  $0.07 
Source: FCC, Eleventh Annual Report to Congress on the State of Competition in the 
Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) Industry, WT Dkt. No. 06-17, released 
Sept. 29, 2006, at tbl. 10. 
 
Table 1 shows that the price of a wireless call, as measured by the revenue per 
minute for the operator or cost per minute from the end-user, has declined from 
$0.43 in 1995 to $0.07 in 2005—a decline of roughly 84 percent in one decade. 
There are few services consumed in the United States that have experienced such 
a rapid decrease in prices. Table 1 also shows that wireless usage has exploded 
over the same period, from 119 to 740 minutes per month.  
In addition to falling prices and higher usage, the quality of wireless service 
appears to have improved significantly. According to a J.D. Power and 
Associates survey released in March 2007, the overall rate of customers 
experiencing a wireless call quality problem declined for a third consecutive 
year.
20 One explanation for the higher satisfaction is the digitization of the 
wireless networks. Digital technology provides better sound quality than analog 
technology. According to the FCC, digital technology is now dominant in the 
mobile telephone sector, with approximately 97 percent of all wireless 
subscribers using digital service.
21 Digital technology also allows for more 
efficient use of the spectrum. By improving network performance, these upgrades 
improved the quality of service in terms of (1) better voice quality, (2) higher 
call-completion rates, (3) fewer dropped calls and deadzones, (4) additional 
calling features, (5) more rapid data transmission, and (6) advanced data 
applications.
22 
The most likely explanation for falling prices is an increase in the number of 
wireless operators, which generates more intense price competition. The FCC’s 
Eleventh Annual CMRS Report reports that, as of 2006, roughly 94 percent of the 
                                                      
20.  J.D. Power and Associates Reports: Wireless Call Quality Problems Continue to 
Decline as the Transition to 3G Networks Takes Hold, Mar. 15, 2007, available at 
http://www.newscom.com/cgi-bin/prnh/20050527/LAF028LOGO-a. 
21.  Eleventh CMRS Report, supra note 12, ¶105. 
22.  Id. ¶131.     
 




U.S. population had a choice of at least four wireless operators.
23 That represents 
an increase from the roughly 80 percent of the population that had a choice of 
four or more operators in 2000.
24 The fact that 14 percent of the population 
(equal to 94 percent less 80 percent) experienced one extra choice in just the past 
five years implies that the supply of wireless service is increasing and that there 
are few barriers to entry.  
Entry into wireless services can occur through expansion of regional wireless 
networks or through new  entry or both. Both kinds of entry occurred in the 
FCC’s recent Advanced Wireless Services spectrum auction, which closed in 
September 2006 after raising roughly $13.7 billion for the U.S. Treasury.
25 
Regional operators like MetroPCS (the fourth biggest winner) and Cricket (the 
sixth biggest winner) expanded their existing wireless footprints and acquired 
sufficient spectrum to offer broadband services.
26 Cable operators Comcast, Cox, 
and Time Warner also acquired spectrum in the auction.
27 According to FCC 
Chairman Kevin Martin, “more than half of the winning bidders were small 
business.”
28 And the entry process is nowhere near complete. In addition to 
spectrum acquisition,
29 firms such as Disney Mobile, Microsoft Media Mobile-
Zune, Wal-Mart, and Virgin Mobile have entered the market as mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNOs), which involves reselling wireless capacity of an 
incumbent operator under a different brand name.
30 The variety of categories of 
MVNOs, which range from “Prepaid” to “Ethnic” to “Youth,” demonstrates the 
niche markets that are now being served by entrants.
31 Thus, applications 
developers, including Skype, could make use of unused spectrum—either by 
acquiring it from the FCC or by purchasing it from wireless operators—as a way 
of resolving their concerns with the alleged buying power of incumbent wireless 
operators.  
2.  There Should Be Clear Evidence That the Proposed Intervention Is 
Likely to Do More Good than Harm 
Proponents of regulation should also demonstrate that the proposed 
intervention will improve efficiency relative to the status quo. The efficiency 
                                                      
23.  Id. at tbl. 11. 
24.  Id.  
25.  FCC, Auction 66 Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1), All Bidders 
Spreadsheet, available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/66/charts/66bidder.xls. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Cable Consortium Acquires Spectrum Licenses Covering National Foot, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 5, 2006, available at 
http://sev.prnewswire.com/entertainment/20061005/PHTH01505102006-1.html.  
28.  FCC Spectrum Auction Closes, T-Mobile Among Top Winners, XCHANGEMAG, 
Sept. 19, 2006, available at http://www.xchangemag.com/hotnews/69h198599.html. 
29.  The FCC’s Broadband Personal Communications Services auction (auction #71) 
is scheduled to begin in May 2007. See FCC, Scheduled Auctions: Auction 71 Broadband 
PCS,  available at 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=71. 
30.  See THOMAS WINTER AABO, US MOBILE VIRTUAL NETWORK OPERATORS 2007: 
THE  DEFINITIVE  GUIDE AND CRITICAL  ANALYSIS OF THE US  MVNO  MARKET, Mind 
Commerce, Mar. 2007. 
31.  Id. at 11.     
 




criterion considers the welfare of consumers and producers in both a static and 
dynamic sense. Wu does not provide any quantitative evidence that his proposed 
remedies are likely to be more efficient than the status quo. Instead, he simply 
asserts that the conduct in question “may be harmful for consumers and 
society.”
32 Skype similarly asserts without empirical proof that “consumers are 
worse off as competition . . . is diminished.”
33 The problem with this argument is 
that, even if it were true, it is not clear that a change in conduct would represent a 
net improvement for consumers and producers. Given the lack of evidence of any 
significant market failure, and given the rapid change in wireless technology, we 
think that the efficiency associated with the status quo cannot be easily improved 
upon.  
The prospects of improving welfare through regulation of industries 
characterized by rapidly changing technology are even more difficult. Wireless 
services are evolving rapidly, from analog voice to digital voice (2G) to data 
(3G) to video (4G). This remarkable progress occurred in the span of one decade. 
As explained by the late William Baxter, who headed the antitrust division of the 
U.S. Justice Department, it would be dangerous to interfere with this kind of 
dynamic industry.
34 For example, who in the later 1990s would have foreseen 
Google’s rise to Internet prominence in just a few short years?
35  
In assessing specific regulatory proposals, researchers should clearly identify 
the benchmark for comparison, or counterfactual. In this example researchers 
should identify what the world would look like with and without the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. Wu implicitly assumes that innovation at the “edges” of 
the network (that is, application developments) would occur at a faster pace in 
the absence of wireless operators’ conduct, but the evidence from the 
marketplace suggests that innovation at the edges has been flourishing. A review 
of FCC annual competition reports and the wireless operators’ websites reveals 
that there have been over 50 significant innovations in wireless applications since 
1999 (see Appendix 1).  
Wu also notes the lack of diversity in wireless handsets.
36 Table 2 shows the 
number of unique brands and models of handsets sold by the top five U.S. 
wireless operators as of March 2007. Our estimate is conservative because it does 
                                                      
32.  Wu at 6. 
33.    Skype Petition at 23.  
34. According to Baxter, regardless of the evidence of consumer harm, if “there is 
no assurance that appropriate relief could be obtained,” then the government must 
question the value to consumers of imposing a remedy. In re International Business 
Machines Corp, 687 F2d 591, 594 (2d Cir 1982) (quoting William F. Baxter, Assistant 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice); Russ Mitchell and Marianne Lavelle, 
Road Runner v. Coyote: As Microsoft Case Shows, Markets Move Faster than Justice, 
US NEWS & WORLD REP 58, 59 (Dec 15, 1997) (quoting Baxter as saying that in dynamic 
industries “companies will compete for markets, rather than in markets.”). 
35. For  the seminal treatment of the role of innovation in the economy, see JOSEPH 
A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Oxford University Press 
1949) (explaining how innovations by entrepreneurs disturb the static equilibrium and are 
the cause of all economic development). 
36. Wu at 13 (“Two sets of consequences flow from the control that carriers exert 
on the marketing and attaching of mobile devices in the United States. One is a loss of 
product diversity. Of the many mobile devices sold even by major providers like Nokia 
and Motorola, only a fraction effectively make it to the U.S. market.”).     
 




not include models that are purchased from a third party, such as Amazon.com, 
that does not provide the wireless service. Nor does it include models offered by 
MVNOs, which offer branded handsets that are unique to their network.  
 
TABLE 2: NUMBER OF UNIQUE BRANDS AND MODELS SOLD BY THE TOP FIVE 
U.S. WIRELESS OPERATORS 
Wireless Carrier  Number of Brands*  Number of Handsets 
Verizon 7  36 
Cingular/AT&T 9  45 
Alltel 9  23 
T-Mobile 4  27 
Sprint/Nextel 6  41 
Total 12  154** 
Source: Verizon Wireless, www.verizonwireless.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2007), T-
Mobile, www.t-mobile.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2007), Alltel Wireless, www.alltel.com 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2007), AT&T Wireless, www.cingular.com (last visited Mar. 13, 
2007), Sprint, www.sprint.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2007). 
Note: * The brands represented include Blackberry, Firefly, Kyocera, LG, Motorola, 
Nokia, Palm, Pantech, Samsung, Sanyo, Sony Ericsson, and UTStarcom. ** The total 
figure eliminates any redundant phones (for example, the Palm 700p is offered by Alltel, 
Sprint, and Verizon, but is only represented once in the total). Several carriers, including 
Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, and T-Mobile, have devices with no easily ascertained brand (for 
example, the T-Mobile Sidekick). These fifteen handsets are captured in the total number 
of handsets. Therefore, the total figure comprises all unique handsets available.    
 
Table 2 reveals that a wireless customer has more than 154 unique handset 
options before committing to a particular wireless operator. Conditional on 
choosing an operator, the customer has on average 34 choices. This estimate is 
highly conservative because it does not include handset options that are not sold 
by the issuing operator. It is incumbent upon those seeking regulation to 
demonstrate that, in the absence of the alleged anticompetitive conduct identified 
here, wireless consumers would currently enjoy more application innovation and 
more choices in handsets. Moreover, even if one could demonstrate greater 
application innovation from the regulation, it is not clear that the benefit of the 
additional application innovation exceeds the additional cost. For example, 
achieving more innovation at the “edges” may come at the expense of less 
innovation at the “core” of the network.  
3.  The Intervention Should Take into Account All Important Benefits and 
Costs 
The third principle is that those seeking intervention must account for the 
regulatory impact on all  important benefits and costs. There is no economic 
rationale for giving more weight to one type of benefit from innovation than 
another. But that tunnel vision is exactly what proponents of wireless net 
neutrality are inclined to do. In particular, Wu elevates “edge” innovations by 
applications developers above innovations at the “core” of the network by    
 





37 It is not clear that innovations at the edges of the network 
are more valuable than innovations at the core.
38 Without innovations at the core 
of the network, it is difficult to support innovation at the edge. The two areas of 
innovation are generally complementary. For example, a video-enabled handset 
is useless on a network with analog spectrum; telecommunication-devices-for-the 
deaf handsets cannot work effectively if there are no corresponding capabilities 
in the network; and GPS-enabled handsets depend on specific capabilities in the 
network.
39 Any attempt to favor producers at the edges could undermine the 
incentives of producers at the core, which could decrease overall welfare. 
4.  The Proposal Should Draw Constructive Lessons from Earlier Attempts 
at Regulation 
Price and entry regulation in competitive industries do not generally make for 
good public policy.
40 While it is true that regulation is sometimes warranted, the 
history of regulatory intervention is replete with examples of good intentions 
gone awry.
41 This is especially true in wireless telephony. The wireless industry 
has been subjected on several occasions to regulation
42 and taxation,
43 and the 
inefficiency of such reforms should not be ignored by proponents of wireless net 
neutrality. On other occasions, regulatory proposals for the wireless industry 
have been rejected by federal agencies.
44 In what follows, we briefly review one 
such experience. 
                                                      
37. Wu at 25 (“A more plausible explanation for the behavior seen here is this: 
carriers believe it makes sense to block a feature to protect an existing revenue source, or 
to keep their own costs low, even if that behavior is bad for actors in the equipment and 
application markets and hurts innovation.”). Wu fails to consider innovation by wireless 
network operators in his objective function. 
38. Hahn  &  Litan,  supra note 2. 
39.  For more examples of the interdependency between application innovation and 
network innovation, see Charles Jackson, Wireless Handsets Are Part of the Network, 
Apr. 24, 2007.  
40.  See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: 
Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks, AEI Brookings Joint Center 
Working Paper 05-18, Sept 2005. 
41.  See Paul L. Joskow & Robert Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An 
Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 1-65 (Gary Fromm, ed., MIT Press 1981); 
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECO. & MGMT. SCIEN., 3-
21 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & 
ECON.  211-240  (1976); Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation,  5  BELL  J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCIEN. 335-358 (1974). 
42.  See J. Gregory Sidak, Hal J. Singer & David Teece, A General Framework for 
Competitive Analysis in the Wireless Industry, 50 HASTINGS LAW REVIEW 1639 (2000).  
43.  See Allan T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, Do States Tax Wireless Services 
Inefficiently? Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Demand, 24 VIRGINIA TAX REVIEW 
249-261 (2004) (showing that we find that reducing the taxation of wireless services by 
one dollar would improve economic welfare by between $1.23 and $1.95). 
44.  See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone 
Regulation?, AEI Brookings Joint Center Related Publication 03-21, Sept. 2003 
(explaining that contrary to arguments made by the California PUC, wireless rates did not 
rise with the elimination of state rate controls); Jerry Hausman, Expert Declaration, in 
CTIA Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling on Early Termination Fees (explaining     
 




Before 1993, states had the power to regulate prices and terms of service of 
wireless providers. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 preempted 
state authority over rate and entry regulation in wireless telephony. The FCC 
chose to waive its right to regulate rates and entry. The states retained some 
authority to regulate wireless service under the general rubric of consumer 
protection wherever state regulation did not interfere with rates and terms.  
For example, the California Telecommunications Bill of Rights sought to 
limit wireless operators’ discretion in a wide range of activities, with the focus on 
disclosure of contract terms and redress in cases in which customers are not 
satisfied with service. In particular, the Bill of Rights, which was approved by the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) in May 2004, required that 
wireless operators (1) supply detailed service agreement information when 
customers sign up, (2) produce bills that are “clearly organized,” containing only 
charges for products and services the customer has authorized, (3) adds 
thresholds for charging late fees, and (4) requires wireless carriers to separately 
list all federal, state and local taxes, surcharges, and fees.
45  
Because many wireless operators use the same billing system to cover 
multiple states, the Bill of Rights forced wireless operators to decide how to 
generate one bill type for the California customers and another for their 
customers elsewhere. A second cost of the regulation was the requirement that 
wireless operators obtain subscribers’ authorization for charges, which adversely 
affected the market for wireless downloads. While traditional billing systems can 
track content charges and render them on a bill, it was not clear how to efficiently 
track customer authorization that often takes the form of printed approvals and 
voice recordings. 
Recognizing these burdens were “too onerous for the cell phone industry,” in 
January 2005, the CPUC voted to suspend and redraft the legislation.
46 In March 
2006, the CPUC approved a revised form of the original “Bill of Rights,” which 
created a fraud unit to investigate sellers who mislead customers about fees and 
services and called for greater state intervention in educating consumers to 
prevent contract abuses.
47  
In addition to demonstrating how regulation of a competitive industry 
imposes unforeseen costs on society, the California Bill of Rights undermines 
Wu’s suggestion that wireless consumers lack “meaningful information regarding 
their service plans.”
48 There is little theoretical basis for thinking that the U.S. 
wireless industry will produce something less than the efficient level of 
information for wireless customers. For example, Sprint recently announced a 
                                                                                                                                    
that such fees are part of a carrier’s pricing structure for recovering revenues to offset 
costs.) 
45. Karen Brown, Breaking Down The Bill: New California regulations require 
carriers to beef up wireless bill information and that may cause them more than a few 
headaches, WIRELESS  WEEK, Aug. 15, 2004, available at  
http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA445086.html?text=bill+audit. 
46. Jordan Robertson, California Regulators Pass ‘Wireless Bill of Rights’, 
Sacramento Uniion, Mar. 2, 2006, available at 
http://sacunion.com/pages/state_capitol/articles/7879. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Wu at 32.    
 




new billing format for its wireless customers,
49 which suggests that carriers pay 
attention to these matters. There are many places where a wireless consumer can 
obtain information. And aggressive state public utility commissions, like the 
CPUC, will be quick to intervene whenever they believe such intervention would 
serve their constituency. Thus, calls for federal intervention to produce more 
information are unwarranted. 
B. Assessing the Benefits and Costs of the Proposal to Prevent Wireless 
Operators from Imposing Certain Limitations on Suppliers 
When evaluating whether to prevent a certain type of contracting between a 
distributor and its suppliers, one must carefully weigh the benefits against the 
costs. Economists describe the constraints imposed on a supplier (by a 
distributor) or on a distributor (by a supplier) as “vertical restraints.” There is a 
large economic literature on the efficiency rationales for imposing vertical 
restraints on suppliers or distributors. The most common rationale for imposing a 
restraint on a distributor is to avoid what economists call the “double 
marginalization problem,” in which the distributor marks up the price a second 
time above the wholesaler’s markup.
50 In his textbook on industrial organization, 
Jean Tirole explains that “[r]estraints that correct this externality tend to be 
welfare improving.”
51 A second efficiency justification for vertical restraints is to 
promote pre-sale information by retailers, which is costly to produce and 
therefore invites free-riding.
52 Tirole concludes that these and other “vertical 
restraints can increase or decrease welfare, depending on the environment.”
53 
Failing to recognize this literature, Wu considers and rejects only one efficiency 
rationale that could explain the wireless operators’ conduct—namely, price 
discrimination.
54 He then concludes incorrectly that the operators’ conduct is 
                                                      
49. Press Release, Sprint Nextel, Wireless Customers Now Have The Power Of 
Simplicity (Apr. 03, 2007) (on file with author).  
50. Because the cost faced by the retailer (the price charged by the wholesaler) is 
higher than the true cost to the wholesaler, the retailer’s profit-maximizing calculus will 
cause it to purchase a quantity of the intermediate good from the wholesaler that is too 
low. The sum of the profits of the wholesaler and the retailer will be lower than the profit 
that would accrue to a hypothetical vertically integrated firm that fulfilled the roles of 
both wholesaler and retailer. By placing vertical restraints on retailers, a wholesaler can 
capture the benefits of a vertically integrated firm and thus obtain the largest possible 
profit.  
51. JEAN  TIROLE,  THE  THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL  ORGANIZATION 186 (MIT Press 
1993).  
52.  Id. at 183. For example, consider the case of an intermediary that invests a 
significant amount of money educating end-users in a particular geographic market about 
a particular brand. If, as a result of these efforts of that intermediary, demand for that 
brand increases in the geographic market, the benefits from that increased demand would 
accrue to both that intermediary and to all other intermediaries that offer that brand but 
engaged in no efforts to develop the brand. Thus, intermediaries would have little 
incentive to engage in product development in the absence of exclusivity, which is why 
suppliers grant exclusive contracts. 
53.  Id. at 186. 
54.  Wu at 35 (“In other words, the other half of the price discrimination strategy is 
missing. Out of Superman is made Clark Kent, but without retaining Superman. That fact     
 




most likely explained as an anticompetitive attempt to “protect an existing 
revenue source.”
55 As we demonstrate below, Wu failed to consider other 
plausible efficiency justifications. 
1.  Banning Certain Limitations Imposed by Wireless Operators Would Not 
Generate Any Benefits for Consumers 
Before considering the costs of banning the alleged anticompetitive conduct 
by wireless operators, we examine the asserted benefits of the proposal. A nearly 
identical anticompetitive theory that is being offered to the FCC in support of 
wireless net neutrality was considered and rejected by an antitrust court in 2005. 
In her opinion in Wireless Telephone Service Antitrust Litigation, Judge Denise 
Cote of the Southern District Court of New York ruled that no individual 
wireless provider had sufficient market power to foreclose an unaffiliated handset 
maker by tying the purchase of the handset to the wireless subscription.
56 The 
plaintiffs, a class of wireless subscribers, argued that the defendants (the wireless 
operators) threatened to foreclose a number of handset makers by leveraging 
their wireless networks to act as a gatekeeper for handsets.
57 In rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ theory, Judge Cote relied on testimony by representatives from some 
of the handset makers to show that the wireless providers did not have the 
requisite market power to foreclose handset makers.
58 She explained that the fact 
that the majority of handsets were sold through the wireless carriers did not 
imply that handset makers could not sell through an outside distributor or that 
they have not done so already.
59  
In what follows, we provide an economic analysis that is consistent with the 
framework used in that litigation. Although it is conceivable that regulation is 
needed to fill some gaps in antitrust enforcement, we conclude that regulatory 
                                                                                                                                    
seems to raise doubts as to whether what the carriers are engaged in what can properly be 
called a price discrimination strategy.”). Skype does not appear to consider efficiency 
justifications at all.  
55.  Id. 
56.  In re Wireless Telephone Services Antitrust Litigation, Opinion and Order, 02 
Civ. 2637 (DLC) (2005). 
57.  Id. at 47. 
58. For example, a Kyocera representative explained that a number of new 
manufacturers have entered the market by selling their products through an alternate 
distributor rather than a wireless carrier and by developing products that they then sold to 
other manufacturers that work with the wireless carriers such as Motorola or Nokia who 
could then provide it to the wireless carrier. Id. at 49. In addition, the representative 
testified that the wireless carriers, when presented with an interesting product made by a 
manufacturer not under contract with that particular carrier, often encourage these 
handset makers to work through an existing supplier. Id. 
59. In fact, an LG representative testified that there is nothing that would stop his 
company from selling directly to consumers in the United States rather, his company 
simply chose not to. Id. at 52. In 2006, Nokia opened a few retail stores in New York and 
Chicago, and it is experimenting with direct sales. See Press Release, Nokia, Start 
spreading the news: Nokia Flagship Store makes its debut in New York City (Aug. 1, 
2006) (on file with author); Press Release, Nokia, Nokia Flagship Stores to offer unique 
wireless shopping experience for US customers (Jun. 19, 2006) (on file with author).    
 




intervention is not warranted here. We begin by defining the relevant geographic 
market for analyzing the competitive effects of the alleged conduct. 
 
a.  Antitrust Analysis Should Start by Defining the Relevant Market 
When evaluating whether a particular type of conduct is anticompetitive, 
antitrust analysis begins with a definition of the relevant product and geographic 
market, which serves as a proxy for the scope of the alternative paths that are 
available to the alleged harmed party. The ability of a wireless operator to inflict 
harm on a handset maker or applications provider depends critically on the 
buying power of the wireless operator. This power depends, in turn, on the 
availability of alternatives for wireless customers. If there are few alternative 
paths, then the operator may have the ability (but not necessarily the incentive) to 
harm rivals. When a buyer controls all of the available paths to the end-users, it is 
said to have “monopsony” power. 
Although there is little dispute as to the relevant product here (the sale of 
wireless handsets or the sale of wireless applications), the relevant geographic 
market may not be as obvious. One possibility is the geographic territory covered 
by a regional U.S. wireless operator that is engaging in the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide the relevant 
question for determining the relevant geographic market: Could a hypothetical 
monopsony buyer of wireless handsets in that region profitably decrease its offer 
price below the competitive rate?
60 If handset suppliers constituting a critical 
share of the market shifted their sales to wireless operators outside of that region, 
then the attempted price cut would be defeated, in which case the geographic 
market would have to be expanded to the entire United States. Of course, a 
monopsony in the purchase of handsets throughout the United States might not 
be sufficient to exercise market power over handset makers (by imposing a price 
cut below competitive rates), in which case the geographic market might have to 
be expanded beyond the United States, and perhaps to the world. 
Indeed, Wu acknowledges that the relevant geographic market for assessing 
the market for the purchase of wireless handsets may be worldwide: “First, the 
cellular phones widely available in the United States are just a small fraction of 
the phones available in the world. As Marguerite Reardon of C-Net points out, 
‘even though Nokia introduced roughly 50 new products into the market last 
year, only a handful were offered by operators in the U.S.”
61 If a U.S. wireless 
operator refuses to carry one of Nokia’s telephones—the most extreme form of 
foreclosure that is not even contemplated by Wu—then Nokia is free to sell its 
handsets to hundreds of non-U.S. operators. The larger the relevant geographic 
market, the smaller are the likely benefits of restricting the contracting practices 
of U.S. wireless operators. 
 
                                                      
60. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, revised Apr. 8, 1997, § 1.2 
61.  Wu at 10. The likely reason why Nokia does not sell its entire line of handsets in 
every geographic market is that the frequency bands and consumer preferences differ 
across markets.     
 




b.  The Market Structure of the U.S. Wireless Industry Is Not Conducive 
to Foreclosure of Unaffiliated Equipment or Applications Providers 
In the previous section, we explained that the relevant geographic market for 
assessing the conduct identified by Wu is conservatively the United States, and 
more realistically, the world. To assess a wireless operator’s ability to harm 
upstream suppliers, one must next examine the degree to which any single 
operator possesses buying power in the relevant geographic market. 
Wireless operators are alleged to have imposed certain restrictions on 
handset makers, such as requiring that all handsets be sold through the wireless 
operator. A more extreme form of foreclosure, and one that is useful for 
clarifying the potential benefits of banning the alleged anticompetitive conduct, 
is complete foreclosure, in which case the wireless operators refuse to deal 
entirely with a given handset maker. Table 3 shows the maximum foreclosure of 
the wireless market that a single operator could impose assuming conservatively 
that the relevant geographic market is the United States. 
 
TABLE 3: MARKET SHARES OF TOP TEN U.S. WIRELESS OPERATORS 




Cingular/AT&T 54,144  26.8% 
Verizon Wireless  51,337  25.4% 
Sprint Nextel  44,815  22.2% 
T-Mobile 21,690  10.7% 
Alltel 10,662  5.3% 
US Cellular  4,945  2.4% 
Nextel Partners  2,018  1.0% 
MetroPCS 2,000  1.0% 
Leap 1,668  0.8% 
Dobson Comm.  1,543  0.8% 
Source: FCC Eleventh CRMS Report, tbl 4. 
 
As Table 3 shows, the largest possible foreclosure share of any single wireless 
carrier is roughly 27 percent (by Cingular/AT&T). This implies that 
Cingular/AT&T, if it were so inclined, could prevent an equipment provider
62 or 
applications provider from reaching at most 26.8 percent of all U.S. wireless 
customers under the most extreme form of foreclosure. Of course, 
Cingular/AT&T does not appear to be considering such a strategy.  
The relevant question for antitrust economists is whether an unaffiliated 
handset maker could achieve the lowest point of its cost curve by serving the 
remaining 73.2 percent of all U.S. wireless operators (not to mention the millions 
of non-U.S. subscribers). If the answer is “yes,” then Cingular/AT&T lacks the 
ability to foreclose an upstream supplier. Because Cingular/AT&T is the largest 
provider, it follows that, if the answer is “yes,” then any other U.S. wireless 
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operator lacks the ability to foreclose an unaffiliated handset maker. Recognizing 
this lack of buying power, and excluding the possibility of collusion among 
providers, it is unlikely that Cingular/AT&T (or any other provider for that 
matter) would attempt to foreclose a handset maker.
63 
 
c. There Can Be No Significant Anticompetitive Effects without 
Foreclosure 
Antitrust economists focus on price as a proxy for short-term consumer 
welfare. Any conduct that undermines the price-disciplining ability of a rival can 
be considered anticompetitive.
64 Forcing a rival to exit the industry entirely (that 
is, “complete foreclosure”) is not necessary to establish consumer harm. Rather, 
anything that undermines a rival’s ability to discipline prices, including raising a 
rival’s cost, is sufficient to generate consumer harm via the price channel. While 
it is possible that a certain type of conduct may harm a competitor (for example, 
by having a smaller incentive to invest), the only mechanism through which the 
conduct can have an anticompetitive price effect on consumers is by undermining 
a rival’s ability to discipline price. Stated differently, some foreclosure is not 
anticompetitive foreclosure. 
As we demonstrated above, complete foreclosure by a single wireless 
operator would not likely prevent a handset maker from achieving the requisite 
economies of scale (that is, the cost of making the handset would be no higher). 
Because the targeted handset maker could supply at a minimum the other U.S. 
wireless operators’, there would be no foreclosure. And without foreclosure, 
there is no prospect of higher prices for consumers, as higher prices require 
higher costs of rival handset makers. Thus, without foreclosure, there can be no 
anticompetitive harm.  
Wu fails to connect his theory of competitor harm with consumer welfare: 
“Yet at the same time, we also find the wireless operators aggressively 
controlling product design and innovation in the equipment and application 
markets, to the detriment of consumers.”
65 It is one thing to claim that such 
conduct will redound to the harm of consumers. It is quite another to explain the 
mechanism by which the harm is transmitted to consumers in the absence of 
foreclosure. Because the anticompetitive harm under this extreme form of 
foreclosure is zero, it follows that the anticompetitive harm under a less 
restrictive form of foreclosure (such as the alleged product crippling) is zero as 
well. 
2.  Limitations Imposed by Wireless Operators Likely Generate Significant 
Efficiencies  
Although many of Wu’s allegations regarding the nature of restraints are 
exaggerated, wireless operators do exert some influence over upstream suppliers 
in several dimensions. For example, Cingular/AT&T requires device certification 
                                                      
63.  It is not clear why operators would want generally to foreclose the development 
of new handsets that could enhance the value of their networks.  
64. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
253-344 (2003). 
65.  Wu at 1 (emphasis added).     
 




for Cingular/AT&T-sold devices activated on its network to help ensure that 
customers have an optimal experience when using a device with Cingular/AT&T 
service. Several operators, including Verizon and Cingular/AT&T, impose usage 
restrictions through the terms and conditions on the service contract. In this 
section, we analyze the efficiencies that would be sacrificed by banning the 
conduct identified by Wu.  
The goal of vertical restraints generally is to align the incentives of the 
retailer with those of its suppliers. One way to think about such restraints is to 
imagine how a vertically integrated firm would behave in the same 
circumstances.
66 In the case of wireless service, vertical restraints are used to 
encourage wireless operators to promote the handset aggressively and discount 
the price of handsets. Operators impose limitations on customers relating to the 
types of attachments and types of applications to ensure a high quality of service. 
The demand for bandwidth-intensive applications is growing significantly, and 
will soon outstrip the capacity of existing wireline and wireless networks. 
Because (1) the capacity constraints facing wireless operators are more stringent 
than those facing their wireline counterparts, (2) wireless networks are shared 
networks, and (3) some features are not supported by the core network, it is not a 
coincidence that wireless operators are imposing more limitations to manage a 
relatively scarcer resource. 
  
a. Use of Exclusive Distribution Contracts Encourages Wireless 
Operators to Promote the Handset Aggressively 
Suppliers in many industries employ exclusivity provisions to induce 
intermediaries to invest in brand development and promotion.
67 The same is true 
in the wireless industry. For example, Wu notes that “in the United States, AT&T 
is the exclusive vendor of the [Nokia] e62. . . .”
68 Handset makers like Nokia and 
Samsung enter into exclusive contracts with wireless operators to ensure that the 
operators are properly motivated to market the handset. In the absence of 
exclusivity, a wireless operator might lack the incentive to invest sufficiently in 
brand development because other operators would free-ride on the efforts of the 
investing operator. That is, the benefits from investment would have to be shared 
with other, non-investing operators.  
The exclusive contract between Samsung and Cingular relating to the 
BlackJack handset is an illustrative example of the benefits of exclusive deals in 
the wireless industry. As of March 2007, Cingular/AT&T was the exclusive 
provider of the Samsung BlackJack smart phone.
69 As a result of this exclusivity, 
Cingular/AT&T featured the BlackJack prominently in television 
advertisements.
70 The exchange of exclusivity for promotional efforts has 
                                                      
66.  See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937).  
67.  Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (asserting that 
vertical restraints have “redeeming virtues” in that they can induce downstream firms to 
engage in promotional marketing efforts that would otherwise be precluded by the free-
rider effect). 
68.  Wu at 17. 
69.  Eric Benderoff, White Pearl added at T-Mobile, CHI. TRI., Jan. 16, 2007, at 2.  
70.  Eric Benderoff, Cingular Places its Bet on BlackJack as Smart Phone Sales 
Increase, CHI. TRI., Nov. 14, 2006.     
 




become common in the wireless industry.
71 Other examples include the 
Blackberry Pearl, offered exclusively by T-Mobile, and the Motorola Q, offered 
exclusively through 2006 by Verizon.
72 Both of these models were promoted 
aggressively. Finally, as we demonstrate below in the case of Apple’s iPhone, the 
exclusive contracts are often imposed by handset makers, not the wireless 
operator, which undermines Wu’s central claim that wireless operators wield 
significant bargaining power vis-à-vis handset makers.  
 
b. Eliminating  Uncertainty  with  Contract Duration Allows the Wireless 
Operator to Discount the Price of a Handset 
Requirements that customers purchase their handsets in conjunction with 
wireless service—that is, pursuant to a bundled rebate—allow wireless operators 
to discount the price of the handset. In exchange for purchasing a handset at a 
discounted price, wireless customers are expected to use that handset with the 
operator’s service for a fixed duration. This fixed duration guarantees the 
wireless operator a stream of revenues, which can be used to discount the price of 
the handset. Customers can typically choose between buying handsets at one 
price with no term commitment or buying handsets at a lower price with one or 
two-year commitments. For example, in March 2007, Verizon Wireless sold a 
LG Strawberry Chocolate handset for $99.99 if purchased with a two-year 
contract for wireless service. If purchased with a one-year contract for wireless 
service, the price of handset increased to $199.99.
73 If purchased without a 
wireless service contract, the price increases to 269.99.
74 Thus, the price of the 
LG Strawberry Chocolate handset under a two-year commitment is roughly 37 
percent of the uncommitted price. This long-term agreement is like an 
“installment contract”
75 
Wu acknowledges this efficiency justification for restraints imposed on 
customers without recognizing that, by doing so, he undermines his call for 
greater regulation: “The primary reason is very well known, and even beloved by 
consumers: the practice of subsidizing equipment purchases with subscription 
fees.”
76 Wu admits that it is the discounted price of the handset, not the restraint 
imposed on the customer per se, that limits entry by unaffiliated vendors: “It is 
possible to buy handsets from unaffiliated vendors in the United States, but they 
                                                      
71.  See, e.g.  David Pringle, Cell Division: After Long Peace, Wireless Operator 
Stirs Up Industry—U.K.’s Vodafone Is Dictating Handsets’ Look and Feel; Nokia Tries 
Resistance—Hiding the Logo on the Back, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2004, at A1.  
72.    Benderoff, White Pearl, supra note 69. 
73.  Phone interview with Verizon Wireless representative Sharine (ext. 5545) on 
March 21, 2007.  
74.    Id.  
75.  In its petition to the FCC, Skype notes that an installment contract is a legitimate 
reason for phone locking. See Skype Petition at 17 (“While regulators in most countries 
do not prohibit handset locking outright, they typically ensure that locking is done for 
legitimate purposes only—such as to prohibit theft or fraud and the enforcement of a 
rental or installment contract, rather than for anti-competitive reasons—and that 
consumers are made aware of handset locks and how to unlock them.”).    
76.  Wu at 10.     
 




cost far more because of the lack of the subsidy.”
77 Remarkably, Wu dodges the 
very issue that is critical in determining whether regulation would impose net 
benefits on society: “Whether the phone subsidies and other barriers to network 
attachments are ultimately a pro- or anti-consumer practice we do not address in 
this paper.”
78 This admission is highly significant: It reveals that his analysis on 
its own cannot justify regulation of wireless operators.  
 
c.  Restrictions on Certain Attachments Help to Ensure the Quality of 
Service for Wireless Customers 
Wireless operators impose certain performance requirements on equipment 
and applications suppliers to ensure that the attachments perform properly. If a 
customer is dissatisfied by the performance of a new feature, the complaint will 
be directed to the operator, not to the upstream supplier. Because the operator 
manages this relationship with the customer, the operator should be able to 
impose requirements on upstream suppliers that ensure high quality of service. 
Preventing it from doing so could give rise to the kind of complaints about 
service quality that Wu raises elsewhere.
79 New equipment needs to be tested to 
ensure that the features function properly on the operator’s network without 
causing interference. The operator’s requirements are likely motivated by the 
requirements imposed by the FCC on device makers relating to power limits and 
out-of-band emissions. Wu fails to distinguish between restrictions motivated by 
FCC compliance or by anticompetitive intent. Because the operator expects to 
earn a steady flow of revenues from satisfied customers, a wireless operator is 
willing to devote significant resources to handset testing. The devices that a 
particular operator sells are designed to be fully compatible with its network. It is 
reasonable for an operator to require the same level of compatibility for a foreign 
attachment.  
 
d.  Restrictions on Customer Usage Can Be an Important Tool for 
Efficient Resource Management 
In addition to imposing performance requirements on equipment and 
applications suppliers, at least one wireless operator imposes usage limitations on 
customers even in an “unlimited” plan. As we demonstrate in Part II.B.3 below, 
Sprint-Nextel, T-Mobile, and Cingular/AT&T place no limitations on data usage 
with the appropriate wireless mobile phone plan. Like any network operator, a 
wireless operator has limited tools to manage its scarce resource. A wireless 
operator must manage network resources so that all customers sharing those 
resources receive a reasonable quality of service. Placing direct restrictions on 
                                                      
77.  Id. at 11. 
78.  Id.  
79.  Id. at 4 (“In Washington, D.C., the wireless world is sometimes described as a 
nirvana for consumers brought on by competition and enlightened government policy. 
Some consumers and groups depict a very different story: a “cell hell” of “dropped calls, 
dead zones, billing errors, and unexpected fees and charges.” The truth lies somewhere in 
the middle.”).    
 




usage can actually increase economic welfare when metering usage is costly.
80 
For example, restricting certain bandwidth-intensive applications, such as 
streaming video or audio, webcam posts, automated data feeds, or VoIP,
81 can 
help ensure that all customers receive a high quality of service on today’s 
primary services—namely, wireless voice and data transmission.  
Resource management is a significant issue for network owners generally, 
but they are especially important for wireless networks. For example, DSL can 
offer to a home or business data rates up to 6.1 megabits per second (Mbps), 
which will support applications that require continuous transmission of video and 
audio. In contrast, wireless technologies like general packet radio service (GPRS) 
offer peak achievable user rate of 56 kilobits per second (kbps),
82 while EDGE 
technologies offer average speeds of 70 to 135 kbps uplink and downlink stream, 
with maximum speeds of 240 kbps.
83 Wireless 3G technologies like universal 
mobile telecommunication system (UMTS) offer average downlink speeds of 
400 to 700 Kbps.
84 Current High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) 
devices average 600 kbps to 1.4 Mbps downlink with peak rates of 3.1 Mbps and 
average 350 to 500 Kbps uplink data rate per user.
85 Thus, the fastest wireless 
broadband systems do not exceed 3.1 Mbps, which implies that the capacity 
constraint could bind more often for a wireless operator than a wireline operator. 
Accordingly, wireless operators should be given great flexibility to impose usage 
restraints to manage the resources of the network. 
                                                      
80.  See Yoo, supra note 2 (showing that when transaction costs render metering 
network-usage uneconomical, imposing restrictions on bandwidth-intensive activities 
may well enhance economic welfare by preventing high-volume users from imposing 
uncompensated costs on low-volume users.).  
81.  Although VoIP may not be considered a bandwidth-intensive application, unless 
all related network components (for example, the compression settings) are optimized to 
handle VoIP, VoIP traffic can consume significant bandwidth. Thus, for all intents and 
purposes, VoIP can be fairly characterized as a bandwidth-intensive application.  
82.  T-Mobile Website, Feature Summary, http://support.t-
mobile.com/knowbase/root/public/tm22892.htm#top. “GPRS speeds up to 56 kbps.”   
83.   See, e.g., AT&T Wireless Website,  Laptop Connect, 
http://business.cingular.com/businesscenter/solutions/wireless-laptop/laptop-connect.jsp. 
“BroadbandConnect compatible devices that are backward compatible with EDGE 
Network, Average download speeds of 70-135 kilobits per second.”;  T-Mobile Website, 
Feature Summary, http://support.t-mobile.com/knowbase/root/public/tm22892.htm#top. 
“EDGE speeds up to 240 kbps.” 
84. Verizon  Wireless,  BroadbandAccess/NationalAccess,  available at 
http://support.vzw.com/capability/broadband_access_popup.html. “Using one of our 
wireless PC cards or BroadbandAccess Connect capable wireless devices with your 
laptop, you can connect to the Internet, corporate intranet, check your email and 
download attachments with average download speeds of 400 - 700 Kbps.”; Sprint 
Website,  What is Mobile Broadband¸ available at  http://support.sprint.com 
/doc/sp9807.xml?id16=kbps. “EV-DO Rev 0: Download: 400-700 Kbps average, 2.4 
Mbps peak; Upload: 50-70 Kbps average, 153 Kbps peak”. 
85. Sprint  Website,  What is Mobile Broadband¸ available at  
http://support.sprint.com/doc/sp9807.xml?id16=kbps. “EV-DO Rev A:Download: 600-
1400 Kbps average, 3.1 Mbps peak; Upload: 350-500 Kbps average, 1.8 Mbps peak.”      
 




3.  Other Limitations on Service Identified by Wu Are Generally Not Used 
by Wireless Operators 
Wu identifies other limitations that are generally not used by wireless 
operators. Yet by identifying these practices in his article, Wu appears to suggest 
that these practices are widespread.
86 In some instances, Wu is careful to note 
that not all operators are engaged in the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. For 
example, regarding the requirement that handsets be sold by the operator, Wu 
admits that Sprint-Nextel allows wireless telephones that are not sold by that 
operator to function on its network.
87 Wu is silent about the relevant policies of 
two other carriers (Cingular/AT&T and T-Mobile), saying only that those 
carriers do not allow their telephones to work on other operators’ networks.
88 A 
survey of the four largest wireless operators reveals that Cingular/AT&T and T-
Mobile both allow their customers to purchase a handset from an unaffiliated 
vendor. See Table 4. Indeed, with one exception (preventing the use of a handset 
on a rival operator’s network),
89 the survey reveals that Cingular/AT&T, T-
Mobile, and Sprint-Nextel do not impose any of the other restraints identified by 
Wu.  
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86.  Wu at 13-14 (“Developers report that carriers have often forced them to remove 
or limit ‘call timers’ from their phones. Call timers can keep track of the length of 
individual phone calls, and can also keep track by month, year, or in total. The carriers, 
reportedly, are concerned that consumers might easily develop an independent and 
possibly different record of their mobile phone usage.”) (emphasis added).  
87.  Id. at 12. 
88.  Id.  
89.  Preventing a handset from functioning on a rival’s network does not likely harm 
customers due to the relatively short useful life of a handset. Consumers tire of their 
handset models roughly every 18 months with improvements in battery life, weight, and 
additional features prompting them to buy newer models. Indeed, consumers likely 
perceive the contract’s expiration as an opportunity to purchase a new handset and 
dispose of their outdated version. Thus, preventing customers from keeping their 
outdated handsets is akin to preventing them from exercising an option that is out of the 
money at expiration.    
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Sources: (1) Section 7, Customer Agreement, available at 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/globalText?textName=CUSTOMER_AGREEMENT&jspName=footer/cu
stomerAgreement.jsp. (Though the Customer Agreement reads "Whether you buy your wireless phone from us 
or someone else is entirely your choice," Customer Service representatives make clear that “someone else” 
refers to an agent of Verizon’s; for example, a Verizon customer can buy a Motorola Phone directly from 
Motorola, but she must get the Verizon version, which will not work for any other carriers.); (2) Cingular uses 
GSM-type phones (http://www.cingular.com/about/our-technology.jsp). Cingular representatives verified that 
an unlocked GSM-type phone can be used with the Cingular network; (3) Paragraph 8, “Terms and Conditions,” 
available at  www.t-mobile.com. (“You may buy a Phone from us, or from someone else, but it must be 
GSM/GPRS equipment that is compatible and approved for use with our network and Services and we do not 
guarantee that all T-Mobile features will be available with such equipment. A T-Mobile Phone may be 
programmed to accept only a T-Mobile SIM card.”); (4) Terms and Conditions, available at 
http://coverage.sprintpcs.com/IMPACT.jsp. (“Our services will only work with our phones”); (5) Verizon 
phones cannot be used with other carriers; (6) Cingular phones can be "unlocked" from the Cingular newtwork. 
Cingular customer service representatives report that Cingular will do this upon request after 3 months of use of 
a Cingular contract or if the customer claims she is traveling internationally. Additionally, there are third-party 
firms that offer unlocking services, such as www.gsmliberty.com; (7) T-mobile’s policy is similar to Cingular’s 
(see previous footnote), available at  http://search.t-
mobile.com/inquiraapp/ui.jsp?ui_mode=question&question_box=unlock.; (8) “Terms and Conditions,” linked 
to at the bottom of http://coverage.sprintpcs.com/IMPACT.jsp. (“Your Device is designed exclusively for use 
on our network and in other coverage areas we make available to you. It will not accept wireless service from 
another carrier.”); (9) While Verizon may have asked some manufacturers to disable call timers, they did not 
require it of all. The Verizon Motorola RAZR v3m, for example, has a call timer. See the user manual for the 
Motorola RAZR v3m available at  www.motorola.com/mdirect/manuals/v3m_9501A90O.pdf. Also see the 
answer to the question “Why does my call timer differ from my bill?” on Verizon’s FAQ, available at 
http://support.vzw.com/faqs/Account%20Management/faq_billing.html; (10) Some phones have call timers; 
(11) Some phones have call timers; (12) Some phones have call timers; (13) Verizon’s Bluetooth Functionality 
Chart shows that the functionality of many of their Bluetooth phones is limited. The chart is available at 
http://support.vzw.com/pdf/BT_Chart_Handsets.pdf. This can also be seen by comparing Verizon’s Motorola 
RAZR V3m to Sprint’s Motorola RAZR V3m. Though the hardware is the same, Verizon’s does not support 
file transfer profiles while Sprint’s does. See V3m User Manual, at 32, available at 
www.motorola.com/mdirect/manuals/v3m_9501A90O.pdf; Sprint’s Motorola RAZR V3m Feature Summary 
page,  available at  http://support.sprint.com/doc/sp9444.xml?id16=razr_v3m_bluetooth_profile.; (14) The 
Cingular version of the popular Motorola RAZR is able to transfer files, whereas the Verizon version is not.  
Source: Cingular Customer service; (15) T-Mobile RAZR V3 Product Page, available at  http://www.t-
mobile.com/shop/phones/detail.aspx?tp=tb2&device=dfb10fd8-c36d-4e2b-a440-6d2a92b2cdb6 (“Bluetooth lets 
you connect your phone to your headset or computer wirelessly.”); (16) Sprint’s Motorola RAZR v3m has more 
Bluetooth functionality than Verizon’s. Sprint’s allows the user to "[t]ransfer addresses to other Bluetooth-
compatible devices and use it as a dial-up modem for Internet access," which Verizon’s does not, as discussed 
in footnote 13; (17) Verizon does not currently offer a standard handset, Smartphone or PDA with WiFi 
capabilities. This can be seen by looking through Verizon’s catalog. While this does not mean they disable WiFi 
technology on devices, it does suggest Verizon is careful to not sell any devices with WiFi capability; (18) Like 
Verizon, Cingular itself does not sell a handset, PDA or Smartphone with WiFi capabilities. One could, 
however, buy a phone with WiFi capability and use it on Cingular; (19) T-mobile sells the MDA and SDA 
handhelds (those are model names), which are WiFi-enabled; (20) Sprint also does not sell WiFi capable 
devices on its website, however one can buy a WiFi capable phone for use on Sprint (such as the UTStarcom 
PPC-6700).  Available at UTStarcom phones, available at 
http://www.utstar.com/pcd/view_phone_details.aspx?mcode=PPC6700&sAct=0; (21) Though users with a little 
technical savvy can figure out a way to transfer pictures without using Verizon’s services, Verizon does not 
support a workaround. A Customer Service representative confirmed this; (22) Pictures can be transferred using 
a data cable or Bluetooth. Customer Service Rep; (23) Same as Cingular; (24) Same as Cingular; (25) 
Contractually user is forbidden from using data plans to download music, videos and the like. The data use is 
intended for basic browsing and checking and downloading emails. See Additional Calling Plan Information,     
 




available at  http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/store/controller?item=planFirst&action 
=viewPlanList&sortOption=priceSort&typeId=3&subTypeId=4&catId=448; (26) With the appropriate plan, 
there are no limitation placed on data usage. See, e.g., Shop for Phones, Plans and More, available at 
http://www.cingular.com/cell-phone-service/cell-phone-plan-
details/?q_sku=sku1030031&q_planCategory=cat1460005. Wu’s cite was from October 16, 2006.; (27) With 
the appropriate plan there are no limitations placed on data usage. See Sidekick Data, available at http://t-
mobile.com/shop/plans/detail.aspx?tp=tb1&id=90ff4d79-019c-43a6-89f8-e2bb14781ce9; (28) With the 






Table 4 shows that no operator requires manufacturers to remove or limit call 
timers.
90 More importantly, many of the practices challenged by Wu are 
attributed to the carrier that a 2006 survey by J.D. Powers ranked the highest in 
call quality performance in five of six U.S. regions.
91 Ironically, this high level of 
customer satisfaction may very well be a function of a more vigorous policing of 
network management. Wu fails to consider the tradeoffs between certain 
limitations imposed by network operators on their subscribers and higher quality 
of service. Indeed, to the extent that consumers do not value the “freedoms” that 
Wu seeks, the tradeoffs cut strongly in favor of greater policing and higher 
quality of service. The network that ranks lowest according to Wu’s idiosyncratic 
preferences ranks highest with consumers. 
Finally, given the level of competition in the wireless industry, an individual 
operator should be entitled to experiment with different business models. 
Wireless consumers’ preferences are evolving, thereby compelling network 
owners to change their offerings. AOL’s “walled garden” approach was very 
successful with consumers at one point in time. As expectations evolved, 
however, this approach, which was mimicked by Prodigy, ultimately proved to 
be a failure. To the extent that competition and changes in demand undermine the 
“walled garden” approach of a single firm,
92 as it has in other industries, 
regulation would not be necessary and, in fact, would likely be counter-
productive.  
 
                                                      
90.  Wu at 13 (“Developers report that carriers have often forced them to remove or 
limit “call timers” from their phones. Call timers can keep track of the length of 
individual phone calls, and can also keep track by month, year, or in total. The carriers, 
reportedly, are concerned that consumers might easily develop an independent and 
possibly different record of their mobile phone usage. While it is clear that destroying an 
independent record simplifies billing practices for carriers, it is less clear how that serves 
the interests of consumers.”).  
91. J.D. Power and Associates Reports: The Number of Call Quality Problems 
Experienced with a Wireless Service has Declined for a Second Consecutive Year, Mar. 
16, 2006, available at http://www.jdpa.com/pdf/2006037.pdf. 
92. A walled garden refers to providing access to content from affiliated providers 
only, in contrast to content from both unaffiliated and affiliated content providers. The 
classic case in dial-up Internet access was America Online. See Robert W. Crandall & 
Hal J. Singer, Life Support for ISPs, REGULATION (Fall 2005).    
 




III. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH PROFESSOR WU’S ANALYSIS 
In this section, we identify other problems with Professor Wu’s analysis. 
Based on that analysis, Skype has petitioned the FCC to extend Carterfone rules 
to the wireless industry.
93 We explain why the market and regulatory conditions 
that potentially justified Carterfone regulation in the late 1960s do not exist in 
the current U.S. wireless industry. Next, we demonstrate that Wu and Skype 
cannot reject the hypothesis that certain services, such as making the phone 
operate like a fully functional camera, are not offered by wireless operators 
because they are not demanded by a sufficient number of wireless customers. We 
also explain why exclusive contracts between wireless operators and content 
providers are unlikely to harm consumers in the wireless market.  
A.  The Market Conditions That Supported Carterfone  Do Not Exist in the 
Current U.S. Wireless Industry   
In 1968, Carterfone filed a complaint with the FCC regarding AT&T’s 
refusal to allow a device that directly connected a mobile radio to the landline 
network.
94 The FCC concluded that AT&T had not adequately demonstrated that 
Carterfone’s device would harm AT&T’s network.
95 In a subsequent rulemaking, 
the FCC expanded Carterfone by allowing users to connect any type of customer 
premise equipment to the telephone network as long as the equipment meets 
certain technical criteria.
96 Wu laments the fact that, “like in the pre-Carterfone 
world, innovative [wireless applications] companies must seek the permission 
and cooperation of the carrier oligopoly. Consequently, the market for consumer 
devices is unusual and distorted.”
97 He credits Carterfone for fostering the 
creation of the fax machine and the answering machine,
98 both of which are now 
obsolete technologies.
99 The proponents of wireless net neutrality fail to note four 
critical differences between the competitive and regulatory environment that 
existed when Carterfone was enacted and the wireless industry of today.
100 
                                                      
93.  Skype Petition at i (“The Commission should act now to enforce Carterfone 
and unlock the full benefits of wireless price competition and innovation.”). 
94.  Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Services; Thomas F. 
Carter v. AT&T, Dkt. Nos. 16942 and 17073, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).  
95.  Id. at 571. 
96.  47 C.F.R. 68.3. To be classified as customer premise equipment—and to attain 
the associated rights of network attachment—the equipment must not present a risk of 
any one of four specified harms: (1) electrical hazards to operating company personnel, 
(2) damage to network equipment, (3) malfunction of billing equipment, and (4) 
degradation of service to customers other than the user of the customer premise 
equipment and that person’s calling and called parties. 
97.  Wu at 9-10.  
98.  Id. at 9. 
99.  The functionalities of the fax machine and the answering machine have moved 
to the network. Skype also refers to the “celebrated Carterfone decision.” See Skype 
Petition at 4. 
100. The closest Wu comes to making this comparison occurs on page 9: 
“Carterfone freed innovators to invent the personal modem, and then ever faster versions 
of the personal modem, without seeking approval from the owners of the telephone lines. 
In the wireless world, the Carterfone rule does not exist. Instead, like in the pre-    
 




1.  There Is No Monopoly Provider 
All theories of vertical foreclosure begin with the premise that the firm has 
monopoly power in the “primary” or “tying” market.
101 Monopoly power in one 
market can be leveraged into a “secondary” or “tied” market. For example, the 
relevant case law for refusals to deal with upstream rivals discourages a 
monopolist from engaging in such conduct where denying access to rivals 
enhances monopoly power.
102 Because AT&T was a monopolist in the supply of 
voice service in the United States in the late 1960s,
103 the FCC’s case against 
AT&T fit the mold of a classic anticompetitive foreclosure.  
AT&T’s monopoly power in voice service in the late 1960s stands in sharp 
contrast to what Wu and Skype refer to as the wireless “carrier oligopoly” of 
today,
104 as if the phrase “oligopoly” had some negative connotation in 
economics.
105 As Table 3 indicates, the largest U.S. wireless operator supplies 
about 27 percent of all wireless customers. It is highly unlikely that a provider 
with such a small share could leverage its alleged power in the “tying” market 
into the “tied” market. Given this fact pattern, it would be unlikely that a plaintiff 
could bring a successful antitrust case against a single wireless operator. Indeed, 
an antitrust complaint brought against several U.S. wireless operators in 2005 
was denied because other critical components of an anticompetitive foreclosure 
case were missing. 
2.  Lack of Vertical Integration into Applications or Equipment 
A second critical component of any foreclosure theory is vertical integration 
or affiliation. Without having an affiliated supplier in the secondary market, the 
“monopolist” lacks the incentive to steer customers towards one vendor over 
another. To make matters concrete, consider a vertically integrated cable operator 
that (1) supplied video service to over 80 percent of video subscribers in a given 
locality and (2) supplied its own local sports programming. Given this conflict of 
interest, the vertically integrated cable operator is not indifferent between its 
                                                                                                                                    
Carterfone world, innovative companies must seek the permission and cooperation of the 
carrier oligopoly.” 
101.  See generally Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct 
and Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. (2001) 
102.  See e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 253 (2003). 
103.  See R OBERT  W.  CRANDALL,  AFTER THE BREAKUP:  THE  U.S. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  INDUSTRY IN A MORE  COMPETITIVE  ERA  17  (Brookings 
Institution 1991) (“After Congress liberalized the antimerger law for telephone mergers 
in 1921, AT&T increased its share of the local exchange business to 80 percent of the 
country’s telephones.”). 
104. Wu at 9; Skype at 21 (“One basic change has been in the structure of the 
wireless marketplace; following consolidation, there are a smaller number of carriers in 
the market, a market many regard as oligopolistic.”). 
105.  Oligopoly simply means an industry that is supplied a small group of firms, 
often characterized by entry barriers. See, e,g., DENNIS CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, 
MODERN  INDUSTRIAL  ORGANIZATION 7 (Addison-Wesley 3rd ed. 2000). Given the 
significant fixed costs in wireless telephony (acquiring spectrum and building a network), 
marginal-cost-based pricing—a result of perfect competition—could not be maintained.     
 




video subscribers watching its affiliated sports programming and watching 
unaffiliated sports programming, as it profits from higher advertising from the 
affiliated programming only.
106 The same was true for AT&T in the late 1960s. 
At that time, AT&T owned an equipment company, Western Electric, which 
manufactured all of the customer premises equipment for AT&T’s customers, 
including telephone sets and other terminal equipment.
107 Indeed, AT&T’s local 
services operating companies were separated from its equipment division under a 
settlement with the Department of Justice in 1982.
108 Before this mandatory 
divestiture, AT&T had strong incentives to favor its own equipment division over 
unaffiliated equipment makers like Carterfone. 
Once again, this vertical integration in the wireline voice market of the late 
1960s stands in sharp contrast to the modern wireless industry. None of the 
wireless operators owns equity in any of the major handset manufacturers, 
including Blackberry, Kyocera, LG, Motorola, Nokia, Palm, Samsung, Sanyo, 
and Sony Ericsson.
109 Thus, the wireless operators lack a financial interest in 
steering their customers to one handset maker over another. Similarly, the 
wireless operators have not significantly integrated into wireless applications 
markets. For example, none of the top content sites as ranked by visits, including 
Google, eBay, ESPN, and Amazon, are subsidiaries of the major wireless 
operators. The lack of vertical integration—a prerequisite for extending market 
power in an adjacent market—is a key ingredient that is missing from Wu’s case 
that Carterfone rules are needed here.  
The only possible upstream application that represents a threat to the profits 
of wireless network operators is VoIP. Even here, however, regulation to protect 
VoIP providers is not necessary. Given the lack of market power of any 
individual wireless operator, any duty to support VoIP will not likely come from 
antitrust enforcement. One could reasonably ask whether regulation is needed to 
fill the potential gap from antitrust enforcement in a case of collective 
foreclosure, in which each wireless operator unilaterally chooses not to support 
VoIP. Because VoIP providers could achieve the requisite economies of scale by 
selling to wireline broadband customers (cable modem and DSL providers), even 
                                                      
106.  See Hal J. Singer & J. Gregory Sidak, Vertical Foreclosure in Video Markets, 
REV. NETWORK ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2007).    
107. CRANDALL,  supra note 103, at 33-34 (“All telephone sets, private branch 
exchanges, and other standard equipment used by residences or businesses were owned 
and leased by the telephone company. Nearly all of AT&T’s customer premises 
equipment was manufactured by Western Electric and sold to the operating prices not 
subject to competitive bid.”).   
108.   Id. at 38 (“After several months of deliberation, the Justice Department and 
AT&T announced their agreement to settle the case. AT&T would divest itself of all 
[local service] operating companies but retain its Western Electric and long lines 
Divisions.”).   
109.  Among the major equipment vendors, the only “cross-ownership” issue that 
we could identify was between Motorola and Sprint. Motorola owned shares in Sprint, 
but according to Motorola’s SEC filing, Motorola sold its remaining shares in late 2006. 
See MOTOROLA INC., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT (SEC Form 10-K), at 41 (Feb. 28, 2007) 
(“In 2006, the $41 million of net gains primarily reflects a gain of $141 million on the 
sale of the Company’s remaining shares in Telus Corporation, partially offset by a loss of 
$126 million on the sale of the Company’s remaining shares in Sprint Nextel Corporation 
(“Sprint Nextel”).”).      
 




the collective foreclosure that would ensue in this example would still not require 
regulatory action.
110  
3.  Existence of Countervailing Bargaining Power Among Applications and 
Equipment Suppliers 
A third factor that distinguishes the current wireless industry from the 
wireline industry circa 1968 is the existence of countervailing market power 
among equipment and applications providers. Wu suggests that “it is de facto 
necessary to obtain the permission of the carrier to market a wireless device in 
the United States,”
111 as if the wireless operators had all the bargaining power. 
Similarly, Skype claims that “[s]uch a ‘permission-based’ approach to innovation 
creates an innovation bottleneck. . . .”
112 Wu cites Apple’s iPhone as an example 
of wireless operators exercising market power:  
Most importantly, to the surprise of many, the iPhone only works on the 
network of a single carrier, AT&T Wireless. The hundreds of millions of 
consumers who are not AT&T Wireless customers cannot make use of the 
iPhone unless they become AT&T customers. The question is, why? Why 
can’t you just buy a cell phone and use it on any network, like a normal 
phone? The main reason is the lack, in the wireless world, of basic network 
attachment rules.
113 
Contrary to Wu’s characterization of how the industry operates, Apple did not 
need the “permission” of a wireless operator to market the iPhone. Indeed, this 
anecdote suggests the exact opposite—namely, that unaffiliated equipment 
suppliers can wield significant market power over the wireless operators. It was 
Apple, not the wireless carriers, who insisted on an exclusive contract. The story 
of the iPhone illuminates who wields the power in these negotiations. 
As the Wall Street Journal reported in February 2007, Apple offered 
Cingular/AT&T a five-year exclusive deal as an incentive to accept the heavy 
and unprecedented demands made by Apple.
114 In particular, Apple demanded, 
among other items, that (1) Cingular/AT&T leave its brand off the phone, (2) 
Cingular/AT&T share with Apple a portion of monthly subscriber revenues, (3) 
the iPhone only be sold through Apple and Cingular/AT&T stores and not 
through other stores with which Cingular usually works, and (4) Apple have sole 
power to decide whether to repair or completely replace a malfunctioning 
                                                      
110.  Even if all wireline broadband providers opted not to support VoIP 
applications, the collective foreclosure across wireline and wireless network owners 
would still not be anticompetitive foreclosure: Although VoIP providers may be harmed, 
the price of voice service in the United States would not likely be affected by the 
elimination of VoIP providers. In conclusion, in the single application in which wireless 
network owners could be said to compete with unaffiliated upstream suppliers, there is no 
need for regulation.  
111.  Wu at 10 (emphasis added). 
112.  Skype Petition at 13.  
113.  Wu at 7.  
114.  Amol Sharma, Nick Wingfield & Li Yuan, Apple Coup: How Steve Jobs 
Played Hardball In iPhone Birth, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2007, at A1.    
 





115 Apple also demanded complete secrecy on the project, allowing only 
three Cingular/AT&T executives to see the phone before its release and severely 
limiting the role of Cingular/AT&T technicians on the project.
116 Moreover, the 
exclusive deal with Cingular/AT&T pertains to the United States only, allowing 
Apple to sell its phone to wireless operators around the world.
117 
Citing Apple’s demands as problematic, Verizon declined Apple’s exclusive 
offer two years before the Cingular deal was announced.
118 For example, Apple 
would not allow Verizon to use its V CAST technology on the iPhone. Second, 
Verizon refused to exclude its outside distributors such as Wal-Mart and Circuit 
City from the iPhone deal. Third, Verizon did not want to allow Apple to 
intervene between Verizon and its customers when making decisions on phone 
maintenance.
119 The iPhone anecdote on which Wu relies seems to undermine his 
claim that upstream suppliers require the “permission” of a wireless operator. 
4.  Wireless Operators Are Not Subjected to Price Regulation That Could 
Allow Them to Benefit from Tying 
Anything that prevents a single-product monopolist from extracting 100 
percent of the consumer surplus (another name for consumer welfare), including 
price regulation, can motivate that firm to look to other markets to increase 
profits. Unlike AT&T in the late 1960s, wireless carriers of today are not 
subjected to price regulation. Thus, wireless carriers lack a powerful incentive 
(possessed by AT&T in the late 1960s) to seek profits in other markets such as 
equipment or applications.  
Antitrust scholars recognized that a monopolist generally lacks 
anticompetitive motives to engage in vertical restraints. They concluded that such 
restraints were motivated for efficiency reasons only. So long as the monopolist 
can extract the entire consumer surplus from the “tying” market, there is no 
incentive to earn more than “one monopoly profit.” Of course, there are some 
exceptions to this rule, such as when the monopoly must charge a single price for 
the tying product, consumers purchase multiple units of the product, and their 
demand is downward sloping.
120 Another impediment to extracting the entire 
consumer surplus is price regulation. When the FCC imposed Carterfone, AT&T 
was subjected to price regulation in the provision of local service.
121 Thus, AT&T 
                                                      
115.   Id.; Leslie Cauley, Verizon Rejected Apple iPhone Deal, USA TODAY, Jan. 
29, 2007. 
116.   Sharma, Wingfield & Yuan, supra note 114, at A1. 
117.   Cauley, supra note 115. 
118.   Id.  
119.  Id. 
120.  See, e.g., Patrick Greenlee, David S. Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust 
Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts  (Economic Analysis Group, Discussion Paper 
No. 04-13, Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=600799.    
121. CRANDALL,  supra note 103, at 24-25 (“The formula—the subscriber plant 
factor—used in allocating the local loop costs was changed twice more, in 1965 and 
1969, in each case raising the interstate share of local costs.”); Nicholas Economides, 
Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, Sept. 2003, available at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/workingpapers03/03-22Economides.pdf (“In the 
1960s regulators did not let prices of basic local service rise in their attempt to achieve     
 




had an anticompetitive motive to tie its customer premise equipment with its 
telephone service—namely, to extract additional consumer surplus in the “tying” 
market. 
This price regulation faced by AT&T in the late 1960s stands in sharp 
contrast to today’s wireless industry. The pricing by a wireless operator is 
constrained by the prices of its rivals. There is nothing that prevents a wireless 
operator from customizing its offering for wireless customers. Thus, wireless 
operators lack an anticompetitive motive to engage in vertical restraints that 
motivated the Carterfone rules. 
B.  Certain Services May Not Be Offered by Wireless Operators Because They 
Do Not Pass a Market Test   
Wu is concerned that wireless operators have failed to supply what he thinks 
are obvious wireless applications. In a well-functioning market, however, there is 
little reason to believe that suppliers will not respond to consumer demand. One 
assumption under which the market will undersupply wireless applications is that 
the marginal private benefits of developing such applications are less than the 
marginal social benefits (the classic positive externality). However, Wu does not 
offer examples of spillovers in use or development of an application, which 
might make a wireless operator reluctant to invest in that application.  
Wireless operators have strong incentives to attract new customers and 
please their current customers. One of the ways to do that is by offering the latest 
technology. As we demonstrate below, many of the allegedly missing 
applications identified by Wu are, in fact, available in the marketplace. 
Moreover, we explain that many of these applications are not prevalent because 
they do not pass a market test. Stated differently, Wu’s preferences over wireless 
applications may not reflect the general preferences of wireless customers. 
1.  Printing Phone Numbers or Addresses from a Wireless Telephone 
Wu suggests that wireless consumers seek to print address contacts directly 
from their wireless handsets but are prevented from doing so by wireless 
operators: “Obvious uses of the [Bluetooth] technology might include 
transferring photos off of camera-phones, printing information from a telephone, 
or backing up address books.”
122 As it turns out, wireless customers can print 
from some handsets. To determine whether such applications are “obvious,” 
however, one must access the demand for printing address books from handsets. 
As of March 2007, there were a handful of wireless phones that allowed 
direct communication with printers. For example, Verizon offered the Samsung 
SCH-a990, which can print directly to a Bluetooth enabled printer.
123 Online 
                                                                                                                                    
“universal service,” i.e., including as many households as possible in the 
telecommunications network, on the basis that this was desirable even if it were 
allocatively efficient.”). 
122.   Id. at 16.   
123.    Verizon Wireless Website, Samsung SCH-a990, available at  
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/store/controller?item=phoneFirst&action=viewPho
neDetail&selectedPhoneId=2406. The functionality of the Bluetooth printing is 
confirmed in a Cnet review. “Alternatively, you can take advantage of the SCH-A990's    
 




reviews confirm the functionality: “Alternatively, you can take advantage of the 
SCH-A990’s TV-out capability to display photos on your TV, or you can send 
them to a Bluetooth-enabled printer right from your phone.”
124 Sprint offers the 
M610 by Samsung, which supports the Basic Printing Protocol, an emerging 
Bluetooth standard for connecting with printers.
125 Thus, any suggestion that 
wireless printing capabilities are completely absent from the marketplace is 
factually inaccurate. Wu also ignores the complexity at issue in getting a wireless 
device to work with a printer—namely, the printer must be Bluetooth-ready to 
receive signals from a wireless device. Until printer manufacturers equip their 
printers with Bluetooth receivers, wireless network owners will be reluctant to 
make the necessary investments.  
Wu cannot reject the hypothesis that such functionality is not readily 
available because it is not generally demanded by wireless consumers. Indeed, 
this functionality has been introduced and subsequently abandoned by operators. 
In late 2002, Research in Motion, the maker of the Blackberry, allowed users to 
print directly from their wireless device.
126 As of March 2007, however, this 
feature was no longer listed on its website. This should come as no surprise for 
those who take part in the “digital economy.” The need to print documents 
appears to be diminishing for most workers, including workers with wireless 
devices.
127 The same trends would compel a wireless customer not to print a 
document. 
Moreover, there are likely to be superior alternatives to printing contacts 
from a cell phone. With respect to a single phone number, it is more convenient 
to write a number on a Post-It note rather than printing it on an 8.5 x 11 inch 
piece of paper. With respect to an entire contact list, the same address book that 
resides in a wireless device also resides in a user’s desktop with the help of 
automatic “syncing.” Syncing can be accomplished through a wireless 
connection, Bluetooth, or a USB cable.
128 The cables and software needed to 
sync a handset with a desktop come standard with most phones and are readily 
available in the after-market.
129 Thus, printing an address book from one’s cell 
                                                                                                                                    
TV-out capability to display photos on your TV, or you can send them to a Bluetooth-
enabled printer right from your phone.”  
124.   Bonnie Cha, Samsung SCH-A990, CNET.com Review, Jul. 20, 2006, 
available at  http://reviews.cnet.com/Samsung_SCH_A990/4505-6454_7-
31968249.html.  
125.   Sprint Power Vision Phone M610 By Samsung Not Your Average Mobile 
Phone, PC  TODAY.COM, Vol. 5, Is. 5, available at 
http://www.pctoday.com/Editorial/article.asp?article=articles/ 
2007/t0505/30t05/30t05.asp&guid=.    
126.   RIM PRESS RELEASE, NeedTEXT Attachment Opener Chosen by Leading Law 
Firms for Wireless Users on RIM BlackBerry, (May 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.rim.net/news/partner/2002/pr-02_05_2002.shtml.    
127.   See, e.g. Jaclyne Badal, Technology (A Special Report): Office Technology – 
Goodbye Briefing Book; A Paperless Board Meeting? It’s Starting to Happen, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 23, 2006, at R11.   
128.   Detailed instructions on printing an address book can be downloaded from 
Microsoft’s website, available at  http://office.microsoft.com/en-
us/outlook/HP030656981033.aspx.   
129.      Cingular sells cables to sync phones, such as the LG C2000, with 
computers.Cingualr Website, (last accessed March 26, 2007), available at      
 




phone can be easily accomplished by printing from one’s desktop.  To the extent 
there is very limited demand for printing directly from a wireless device, it is no 
surprise that such functions are not available in the marketplace. 
2.  Using a VoIP Phone with a Laptop That Connects to the Internet via a 
Wireless PC Card 
Wu complains about the lack of mobile VoIP options.
130 In particular, he is 
concerned that wireless customers cannot cancel their voice plan and instead use 
a VoIP-enabled device in conjunction with (1) a laptop that connects to the 
Internet via a wireless PC card
131 or (2) a nearby “friendly wireless network.”
132 
He cites handsets like the Netgear SPH101 that “do not work on the cellular 
networks operated by the commercial wireless carriers” but “are Wi-Fi phones 
only—typically only allowing a user to make phone calls using Skype or other 
VoIP providers within range of a local area or public Wi-Fi network.”
133 
Similarly, Skype complains in its petition of restrictions placed on consumers 
using data packages for VoIP calls.
134  
The availability of VoIP-enabled wireless cards is likely to be determined by 
the simple economics facing end-users. A comparison of the monthly cost of a 
VoIP plan plus an unlimited mobile data plan (“mobile VoIP option”) versus a 
standard wireless voice plan is illustrative. The cost of a monthly unlimited data 
plan from either Cingular/AT&T or Verizon is $79.99.
135 The cost of a VoIP 
service that allows users to make unlimited calls from Vonage is $24.99.
136 The 
                                                                                                                                    
http://cingular.scp4me.com/ItemDetail.aspx?ItemNo 
=81571CW&make=LG&model=C2000&ProductClass=DATA. See also, Kent German, 
Weekend Project, Sync your cell phone with your computer, ZDNet.com, Jan. 23, 2006, 
available at http://review.zdnet.com/4520-11400_16-6416968-1.html?tag=bnav.   
130.   Wu at 17.   
131.   Id. at 19.   
132.   Id. at 19.  By advocating a “friendly wireless network,” Wu appears to 
demand a network that allows users to do virtually anything they want. This would 
include downloading any bandwidth-intensive content, attaching any foreign device, and 
making phone calls—the lynchpin of any wireless service—for free. In the absence of 
market failure, the interests of wireless carriers generally coincide with the interests of 
their customers. It is not necessary to seek regulation that would alter the behavior of 
wireless operators for the sake of promoting the interests of VoIP providers only.   
133.   Id. at 17.  
134.   Skype points to the terms of service for Verizon and AT&T, arguing that their 
terms go beyond prohibiting activities that might harm the network. See Skype Petition at 
19.   
135. Verizon  Website,  available at 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/store/controller?item=plan 
First&action=viewPlanList&sortOption=priceSort&typeId=5&subTypeId=13&catId=40
9.  See also, Cingular Website, available at http://www.cingular.com/ cell-phone-
service//cell-phone- plans/laptop-connect-plans.jsp.  
136. Vonage Website, http://www.vonage.com/services.php?lid=nav_services. 
Vonage also offers a plan with 500 minutes, but this is not economically viable at any 
usage level. Id.     
 




cost of unlimited calls from Skype is $2.50 a month.
137 These combined costs 
exceed the cost of a traditional wireless voice plan, which begin at roughly $40 
per month. To be indifferent between the two options, a consumer would have to 
consume 1350 minutes (using Skype) or 2010 minutes (using Vonage). 
According to the most recent FCC report, however, the average mobile user 
consumed 740 cellular minutes a month.
138 At this level of usage, a subscriber 
would clearly be better off using a standard wireless voice plan.
139 The same 
calculus applies for a customer who wants to use VoIP in conjunction with a T-
Mobile account in a “friendly wireless network” such as Starbucks. Because the 
very consumers who would be interested in mobile VoIP are “the more frugal 
who may be limiting their usage and spending”,
140 it is highly unlikely that they 
would be willing to incur the high cost for mobile VoIP calling.  
3.  Using Wi-Fi Connectivity to Write Emails and Browse the Internet with a 
Wireless Telephone 
Wu claims that “with a few notable exceptions, it is difficult today to find a 
Wi-Fi capable cell phone.”
141 He also claims that “[m]ost carriers will not sell a 
                                                      
137.   Skype  Website,  available at http://www.skype.com/ ($29.95 yearly cost 
divided by 12). 
138.   Eleventh CMRS Report, supra note 12, at 106.   
139.   The numbers used in this example are likely to be conservative for several 
reasons. First, by removing restrictions on usage, the cost of data services would almost 
surely increase, raising the cost of the mobile VoIP option relative to a standard wireless 
voice plan. Second, this example ignores the free nights and weekends offered under 
standard wireless voice plans. Third, it ignores the upfront cost of VoIP phones and 
wireless PC cards. Phones that can be attached to a computer for VoIP services cost 
anywhere from $19.95, to $149.95, and low end data connection cards cost $49.99. See 
Skype Shop, available at http://us.accessories.skype.com/store/skype/DisplayHomePage; 
Cingular Website, Phones and Devices, available at http://www.cingular.com/cell-phone-
service/cell-phones/pc-cards.jsp?zipPass=true.  Fourth, Vonage’s unlimited plan states 
that Vonage can discontinue service for usage above acceptable levels: “We reserve the 
right to immediately disconnect or modify your Service if we determine, in our sole and 
absolute discretion, that your use of the Service or the Device is, or at any time was, 
inconsistent with normal residential usage patterns.” See Vonage Terms of Service, 
available at http://www.vonage.com/features_terms_service.php. It is not clear whether 
Vonage would consider three times the average cell phone usage to be “inconsistent with 
normal residential usage patterns.”  
140.   In-Depth Analysis: Consumer Demand for Cellular/Wi-Fi Services, 
Mindbranch Research Summary, Dec. 2006, available at 
http://www.mindbranch.com/Consumer-Demand-Cellular-R97-2670/ (“Instead, the more 
frugal customers who may be limiting their usage and spending to avoid unexpected bills 
are a more important—but difficult to identify—market.” 
141.   Wu at 17. Wu notes two exceptions in his footnotes, saying that the iPhone 
and the Dash will both feature Wi-Fi. Id. (“AT&T will soon offer the Apple iPhone, 
which has Wi-Fi capabilities. Also, since October 2006, T-Mobile has offered a plan in 
the city of Seattle whereby consumers can use a hybrid telephone, sold by T-Mobile, in 
T-Mobile’s ‘hotspots,’ although this feature also entails an extra monthly fee. In addition, 
also in October 2006, T-Mobile began to make available the ‘Dash’ smartphone with Wi-
Fi capabilities. Users can also buy Wi-Fi phones in Europe or Asia and import them.”)      
 




Wi-Fi phone at any price.”
142 Using a Wi-Fi connection, Wu asserts, a wireless 
handset operating on a “friendly wireless network” could be used to write emails 
and browse the Internet without having to subscribe to a traditional mobile data 
plan.
143  
There are numerous explanations (unrelated to protecting an ancillary 
revenue stream) for why a wireless operator would limit Wi-Fi capabilities in a 
handset. The most obvious is battery life. Batteries are one of the chief limiting 
factors for handsets,
144 and consumers often make choices among handsets based 
on battery life.
145 Accordingly, operators evaluate features, including Wi-Fi, on 
the basis of power consumption. Wi-Fi consumes more power in both 
transmit/receive mode and standby mode. In transmit/receive mode, Wi-Fi 
requires between 12 and 16 percent more power than cellular radios.
146 The 
disparity is even greater in standby mode, where Wi-Fi uses between 130 and 
150 milli Amperes per hour (mAh). A standard cellular connection requires 
between 2 and 4 mAh. Thus, a Wi-Fi connection requires between 37 and 75 
times the power required by a standard cellular connection.  
Wu’s example of the Nokia e61 and e62 underscores the trade-off between 
advanced features and battery life. In standby mode, the e61 can operate up to 9.5 
days with Wi-Fi activated;
147 the 362, which lacks Wi-Fi capabilities, can operate 
up to 14 days.
148 Given the choice between extending battery life and enabling 
Wi-Fi functionality, it is perfectly reasonable for a wireless operator to choose 
not to include Wi-Fi functionality in some of its handsets. 
Wu’s claim that it is difficult to find Wi-Fi enabled phones in the United 
States is false. As of March 2007, all five nationwide service providers offered at 
least one Wi-Fi enabled phone. In addition to the examples provided by Wu, the 
following Wi-Fi phones are available in the United States: Cingular’s 8525,
149 T-
                                                      
142.   Id. at 35.   
143.    Wu at 17 (Wu cites an MSN columnist saying that “What some carriers fear 
most is the e61’s ability to handle VoIP calls when you’re near a friendly wireless 
network. That’s why we won’t see Wi-Fi on the e62.”) (emphasis added).  
144.   Mike Hughlett, Batteries Hit Their Boundaries; Engineers are Working To 
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will consume all the energy you give them and scream for more,’ Howard said.”)  
145.   See, e.g. Walter Mossberg, BlackJack Beats Out Palm 750, but iPhone May 
Well Top Both, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, at B1 (“Also, the BlackJack claims 38% better 
battery life than the Treo, and it runs on a faster data network than the Treo.”)  
146.  Arjun Anand, et al., A Quantitatvie Analysis of Power Consumption for 
Location-Aware Applications on Smart Phones, Dept. of Computer Science, Electrical 
and Computer Engineering, and Information Systems, New Jersey Inst. Of Tech, at 4, 
available at http://web.njit.edu/~borcea/papers/isie07.pdf.   
147.   Nokia UK Website, e61 Page, available at http://www.nokia.co.uk/A4221032 
(last accessed Mar. 28, 2007).   
148.  Nokia US Website, e62 Page, available at 
http://www.nokiausa.com/phones/E62/0,7747,feat:1,00.html. (last accessed Mar. 28, 
2007).   
149.   Cingular Website, Cingular 8525, available at http://www.cingular.com/cell-
phone-service/cell-phone-   
 









153 These Wi-Fi models were identified using a 
simple search on the operators’ websites. 
Finally, Wu cannot reject the hypothesis that Wi-Fi capabilities in handsets 
are generally limited because consumers do not demand those features. Market 
research indicates that there is little consumer interest in the actual technology 
requirement for special mobile phones.
154 Market research also indicates that the 
market for Wi-Fi phones is difficult to identify, or else it would be served 
already.
155 Given this market research, the most likely explanation for the lack of 
Wi-Fi functionality in wireless handsets is insufficient demand.  
4.  Uploading Pictures Taken from a Wireless Telephone 
Wu claims that “when camera capabilities began appearing in telephones, 
equipment developers and carriers came into conflict.”
156 He argues that “many 
carriers successfully forced equipment developers to make photo-sharing services 
the only way to get photos off of a camera-equipped phone.”
157 He concludes that 
“it seems hard to see how consumer interests are served by making it harder for 
consumers to send photos to themselves.”
158 
                                                                                                                                    
details/?q_list=true&q_phoneName=Cingular+8525&q_sku=sku310005 (last accessed 
Mar. 27, 2007).  
150.  T-Mobile Website, T-Mobile MDA, available at http://www.t-
mobile.com/shop/phones/Detail.aspx?device=8802ddeb-1ee4-477a-9608-d9cd1e2a903f  
(last accessed Mar. 27, 2007). 
151. Verizon Wireless Website, Verizon Wireless XV6700, available at 
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artState=group (last accessed Mar. 27, 2007).  
153.  Alltel Wireless Website, UTStarcom PPC6700, available at 
http://www.alltel.com/phones/audiovox/6700.html (last accessed Mar. 27, 2007).   
154.  In-Depth Analysis: Consumer Demand for Cellular/Wi-Fi Services, 
Mindbranch Research Summary, Dec. 2006, available at 
http://www.mindbranch.com/Consumer-Demand-Cellular-R97-2670/ (“There is strong 
consumer interest in the types of billing and service plans that VoWLAN/cellular 
converged services could provide. However, there is little interest in the actual 
technology requirement for special mobile phones and a Wi-Fi connection to an existing 
broadband service.”). See also, In-Depth Analysis: Consumer Demand for Cellular/Wi-Fi 
Services, In-Stat Mobile Consumer Catalog, Dec. 2006, available at 
http://www.instat.com/catalog/wcatalogue.asp?id=231. 
155.   Id.   
156.  Wu at 14. 
157.  Id. at 14. 
158.  Id. at 15.     
 




In contrast to Wu’s characterization, many handsets allow users to transfer 
photos through a memory card.
159 This method is identical to the way that photos 
are transferred from dedicated digital cameras.
160 Service providers such as 
Verizon are making it easier to transfer photos directly to Internet video sharing 
sites such as YouTube and Revver.
161 Wu’s observation that Bluetooth transfers 
are unavailable can likely be explained by the fact that such transfers are more 
complicated than other methods.
162  
Furthermore, the availability of photo transfer capabilities is also likely to be 
determined by the demand for such services. As of March 2007, most handsets 
did not easily transfer photographs to the Internet because most wireless 
consumers did not demand that service. According to Forrester Research, only 28 
percent of cellular subscribers use their phone to take digital photos.
163 Moreover, 
only 15 percent of cellular subscribers ever transfer photos from their handset to 
another device.
164 Most consumers prefer to use dedicated digital cameras, 
especially for travel.
165 While the demand may vary around the world, the 
                                                      
159.   Terry Mason, Smile! Phone Takes Nice Pix, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, at 
E2 (“On the bottom, there's a slot for a micro SD card to store images, which can also be 
stored on the phone. You'll want to use that memory card to transfer the photos to your 
computer.”).   
160.   Sascha Segan, Camera Phone; We take our Best Shot at Helping You Pick the 
Right Camera Phone, PC MAGAZINE, Jun. 20, 2006 (“If you intend to use your phone’s 
camera frequently, make sure it has removable memory. That way, you can pop a mini-
SD or micro-SD card into your phone, take some pictures, pull it out and drop it into a PC 
card reader-just as you would with a ‘real’ digital camera.”).   
161.   Jessica Vascellaro, News Picture Changes With Cellphone Video, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 3, 2007, at D4 (“Carriers also are making it easier for customers to send videos 
straight to Web video sites. For example, Verizon Wireless recently announced that 
subscribers to its $15 a month V CAST service will soon be able to upload their video 
clips directly to video-sharing sites YouTube and Revver Inc. from their phone. Doing so 
is expected to cost 25 cents a clip, unless photo and video messages are covered by their 
messaging plans.”).  
162.   Id. (“Bluetooth file transfer, though, is overrated; it’s more complicated to use 
than either of the other two options.”). 
163.   James  Granelli,  Picture Gets Clearer for Cellphone Camera Users; The 
Industry Improves Photos’ Quality and Makes It Easier to Move Them to a PC or 
Printer, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006, at C1 (“About 40% of cellphone customers have 
cameras in their handsets, according to a survey by Forrester Research Inc. But 30% of 
them never use the camera and 46% say the photos they take have never left their 
phones.”). Multiplying the percentage of subscribers with camera phones (40 percent) by 
the percentage of those users who use their camera phones (70 percent) equals 28 
percent.  
164.   Id. Multiplying the percent of users who use their camera phones (28 percent) 
by the percent of those users who transfer photographs from their camera (100 – 46 = 54 
percent) equals 15 percent.     
165.   Sarmad Ali, Three Phone Makers Point to Advances in Camera Cellphones, 
WALL ST. J., May 25, 2006 (“Camera phones are steadily improving, but my guess is that 
most consumers use them as backup cameras. They prefer digital cameras for big events, 
such as weddings and vacations.”).    
 




segment of the U.S. market that is potentially interested in such services is 
probably too small to justify more advanced camera capabilities.
166  
Finally, a “hedonic” valuation approach can be used to estimate a consumer’s 
willingness to pay for advanced photography features on a wireless handset. By 
comparing two handsets that differ only in a single dimension (photo 
capabilities), one can infer the incremental price or value of that feature. Of 
course, the incremental price serves as a lower bound for the value of that feature 
for those customers who elect that option. Nevertheless, it provides a crude 
estimate of the value for wireless customers. Consider the Samsung D347, which 
is identical to the Samsung D407 in features, size, and standby time with the 
exception that the D407 has a camera. Without a contract, the D347 retails for 
$199.99, while the D407 retails for $219.99.
167 Using this example, a camera 
increases the value of a phone across all wireless customers by roughly 10 
percent. (Of course, those customers who select that option value the photo 
capabilities by more than the incremental price of $20.) Wireless operators and 
their handset vendors cannot increase photo capabilities, and thereby increase the 
cost of a handset, by more than what consumers are willing to pay for those 
enhancements. 
5.  Transferring Ringtones from a Laptop to a Wireless Telephone 
Wu argues that wireless customers should be able to transfer files 
downloaded from a laptop or a desktop to a wireless handset. Although such a 
transfer sounds plausible, most customers are not willing to incur the aggravation 
of getting two electronic devices to communicate. Wu is particularly critical of 
the apparent difficulties in transferring ringtones to a wireless device: 
For example, again, many carriers cripple Bluetooth’s media transfer 
capabilities. Bluetooth makes it easy to communicate between a computer and 
cell phone, so blocking helps preserve an existing revenue source—the prices 
the companies can charge for songs, ringtones, wallpapers, and other content. 
In other words, with a more open system, a consumer could get what she 
wanted without passing the carrier’s “tollbooth.”
168 
According to Wu, operators prevent such transfers to compel subscribers to 
download the ringtones using the operator’s preferred service. But if subscribers 
prefer to download ringtones directly to their handsets, which makes infinite 
sense, then “preventing” them from involving an intermediate step does not 
amount to a binding constraint. Once again, Wu seemingly ignores a widespread 
demand by consumers to simplify life in the digital age. Even if one could save 
                                                      
166. One important impediment to transferring other types of content from a 
wireless handset relates to intellectual property rights. For example, if a network owner 
can demonstrate to a music label that a song can be listened to only once, then the 
network owners can negotiate a lower royalty rate. Wu fails to consider the role of 
property rights in the transfer of content from wireless devices.  
167.    Cingular Website, Phones and Devices, available at 
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money by involving a laptop in the ringtone purchase, it is not clear that the 
monetary savings could offset the added time invested, not to mention the mental 
anguish of getting multiple devices to communicate. 
C.  The Blocking of Bandwidth-Intensive Applications such as Videos or Games 
Is Not Discriminatory and Therefore Is Not Anticompetitive 
According to modern antitrust law, a refusal to deal with a rival or upstream 
supplier is anticompetitive only if it is done (1) by a firm with monopoly power 
(2) on a discriminatory basis.
169 Clearly, the first condition is not satisfied here, 
which makes the following explanation (of why a wireless operators refusal to 
support a particular bandwidth-intensive application is not anticompetitive) 
largely academic. It is perfectly legal under the antitrust law for a firm—even a 
monopolist—to deny a supplier from accessing the firm’s customers so long as 
the denial is uniformly imposed across all suppliers. When a network operator 
chooses to limit certain bandwidth-intensive applications, it limits such content 
on a non-discriminatory basis. That is, it does not permit the use of bandwidth-
intensive applications from preferred content providers while blocking 
bandwidth-intensive applications from others. Such treatment, if it were to occur, 
would constitute a “discriminatory refusal to deal” under the antitrust laws. 
Professor Einer Elhauge argues that duty-to-deal claims should be limited to 
cases in which a monopolist discriminates against rivals by refusing to deal with 
them on the same terms that it deals with others.
170 Discriminatory refusals to 
deal with rivals are considered anticompetitive because they cannot be justified 
by any effect on investment incentives.
171 Moreover, discriminatory refusals to 
deal with rivals are easier to remedy because the remedy does not require courts 
to set prices but only to require the defendant to charge rivals the same rates as it 
voluntarily charges others.  
These insights of modern antitrust law could, in principle, be applied to the 
question of whether wireless operators would have a duty to deal with content 
providers (assuming counterfactually that the operators are somehow 
monopolists). Wireless operators generally have not discriminated against 
bandwidth-intensive content providers. In the rare exceptions,
172 the apparent 
                                                      
169.  Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko is the most 
recent Supreme Court case on the duty to deal. It involved a claim against Verizon, an 
incumbent local exchange carrier, for failing to treat customer orders filed by a 
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discrimination—that is, preference for one content provider over another—
appears to be a byproduct of a policy designed to manage a scare resource, which 
we explain in greater detail below. In general, the limitations apply equally to all 
bandwidth-intensive applications. It is thus reasonable to infer that these 
limitations are motivated by technological considerations, most likely relating to 
capacity constraints on wireless networks that were originally designed to carry 
voice signals only.  
D. Professor Wu’s Claim Regarding Application Innovation Is Based on a 
Handful of Quotes from Anonymous Vendors Who Were Rejected by 
Operators 
Wu offers a pessimistic assessment of the current state of wireless 
applications: “Application development for mobile devices is stalled, and it is in 
the carriers’ own interest to try and improve the development environment.”
173 
To support this assessment, he points to a handful of anonymous quotes from 
applications developers who were presumably rejected by a wireless operator. 
Six of the quotes are reproduced below: 
 
•  As one developer put it, “You just can’t sell in this market like you do in others. 
The carriers have ultimate control over what products reach the market. If they 
don’t like what you’re doing, that’s too bad.”
174 
 
•  “We were used to selling PDAs (personal digital assistants). But the wireless 
market was like night and day. Basically, the carriers have all the power,’ said 
the former wireless marketing director of a PDA manufacturer.”
175 
 
•  As one developer said, “The first thing you want to do with a photo is get it off 




•  As one consumer wrote about Sprint’s offering: “so.. wtf i pay $5/month just for 
the service and i also the .2/.3 cents/kb for a data transfer?? for every single 
picture?? wtf kind of bull**** is this?”
177 
 
•  In the words of a Verizon customer: “Verizon’s greed hurts its customers…One 
phone call to Motorola’s dedicated V3C support line (800-657-8909, for those 
who want that number) verified that the problem was Verizon’s own limit of 
300 Kb on MMS and email attachments — and led to the Motorola tech 
expressing extreme exasperation that his company was willing to put its 
products in the hands of customers via a middleman (Verizon) who crippled 
those products before passing them on.”
178 
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173.  Wu at 3. 
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•  In the words of another commentator: Developing any kind of mobile 
application is a tarpit. A tarpit of misery, pain and destruction.
179 
 
Such evidence may be suggestive, but it is hardly persuasive. It is almost always 
possible to identify one spurned vendor who believes his product was rejected by 
incumbent buyers for the wrong reasons—that is, unrelated to economic merit. 
Even under a completely merit-based procurement system without any favoritism 
towards preferred developers, there will be winners and losers. Thus, Wu’s 
quotes from anonymous developers who may represent the losers should be 
viewed with a healthy skepticism. It would be just as easy to supply quotes from 
a handful of successful applications providers, which should also be viewed with 
skepticism.  
E.  So Long as the Content Is Easily Replicable, There Can Be No Harm from 
Exclusive Contracts 
The consumer welfare effects of exclusive contracts for programming, 
whether it is video or audio in nature, depend on the availability of substitutes for 
the exclusive content. In some cases, the content can be easily replicated; in other 
cases, it cannot. Regulators should focus more on those cases where the content 
is difficult to replicate because it is in these cases where the possibility of 
consumer harm is most likely. Fortunately, it appears that content that is subject 
to exclusives in the wireless industry, such as music libraries and ringtones, is 
relative easy to replicate. Thus, regulators should permit the use of exclusives, as 
they are likely motivated by efficiency justifications. 
A simple example can help to illustrate the idea. If Verizon Wireless 
exclusively uses V CAST for its music library, and if Cingular/AT&T 
exclusively uses iTunes for its music library, then, to the extent that the two 
libraries are overlapping, a Verizon subscriber does not need to subscribe to 
Cingular/AT&T to access songs for her handset. Contrast this situation with the 
use of exclusive contracts for content by multi-video programming distribution 
(MVPD) providers. If DIRECTV enters into an exclusive contract with Major 
League Baseball (MLB), and if Comcast enters into an exclusive with the 
National Basketball Association (NBA), then an MVPD subscriber who wanted 
to watch both professional baseball (MLB) and professional basketball (NBA) 
would have to subscribe to both DIRECTV and Comcast. Although such a 
scenario may not invoke much sympathy among economists (who subscribe to 
“no free lunch” ethic), it is reasonable to argue that such customers would be 
better off if exclusives were banned. 
Such arguments have no merit in the wireless industry. Yet Wu suggests that 
regulators should “scrutinize” these practices:  
At a minimum, regulators should use the same basic general scrutiny for the 
broadband services of wireless carriers. At issue, in particular, are the 
contractual bans on the use of wireless connections for perfectly legitimate 
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purposes, such as buying music from iTunes or downloading videos from 
YouTube.
180  
Wu fails to appreciate the fact that capacity limitations may prevent an operator 
from allowing subscribers to download bandwidth-intensive applications from 
multiple sources.
181 For these reasons, his call for greater regulatory scrutiny of 
wireless operators should be rejected. 
 
IV. BECAUSE WIRELESS NET NEUTRALITY IS UNLIKELY TO PASS A COST-
BENEFIT TEST, THERE IS NO APPARENT ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR 
REGULATION 
We have argued that Wu has failed to satisfy the relevant economic criteria 
for wireless net neutrality regulation. In this section, we briefly review the 
specific policies that he and other proponents of wireless net neutrality advocate. 
A.  Should Wireless Operators Be Compelled to Allow Customers to Attach Any 
Safe Device to the Wireless Network? 
In competitive markets like wireless services, a network operator has an 
incentive to make reasonable economic decisions concerning the devices that can 
be attach to its network. In the absence of market power and vertical integration, 
it is not appropriate for a regulator to second guess a wireless operator regarding 
decisions that affect network performance. If a device increases a consumer’s 
willingness to pay for the service, and if the device does not unduly strain 
network capacity, then the operator will be inclined to allow that device to be 
attached to the network so long as the transaction is profitable. The only potential 
for conflict is a device that threatens ancillary revenues; however, the consumer 
welfare implications of those incentives are not likely to be significant here 
because VoIP providers can achieve the requisite economies of scale from 
wireline broadband providers. Because a VoIP phone connected to a laptop 
connected to a wireless card (three devices) is a poor substitute for a traditional 
mobile telephone (one device), any restrictions on attachments are more likely 
motivated by legitimate operational concerns, and should therefore be allowed. 
B.  Should Wireless Operators Be Compelled to Allow Customers to Use the 
Applications of Their Choice and View the Content of Their Choice? 
Before embracing a proposal to compel wireless operators to allow 
customers to use any application of their choice, regulators should carefully 
consider how such rules would affect the operation of wireless networks. In the 
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absence of a market failure, a network provider is likely to make all Internet 
content available to customers, subject to capacity constraints, because it is in its 
interest to do so. Thus, we observe that non-bandwidth-intensive content is 
available to customers. No operator would prevent a customer from accessing a 
text-based website because it contained inflammatory content. By contrast, a 
network operator may prevent its customers from continuously accessing 
bandwidth-intensive applications such as webcam posts, streaming video, or 
VoIP for extended periods. In general, these restrictions apply equally to all 
bandwidth-intensive applications. In the rare exceptions in which a wireless 
operator allows a single bandwidth-intensive application, the restrictions are 
likely motivated by a concern for spectrum management. Forcing a wireless 
operator to accept bandwidth-intensive applications would be akin to forcing a 
DSL operator to accept streaming video signals in high definition from multiple 
sources. There is simply insufficient capacity to allow such freedom. 
C.  Should Wireless Operators Be Compelled to Disclose Any Limits Placed on 
Devices and on Bandwidth Usage?  
Greater disclosure generally has benefits, but the costs of such disclosure can 
outweigh those benefits. Before considering disclosure regulation, analysts 
should examine whether (1) there is a demonstrated market failure and (2) the 
economic benefits of mandatory disclosure outweigh the costs. Wu does not 
identify a clear market failure. Instead, he simply asserts that: “Competition 
depends on information to work. Consumers cannot make wise decisions unless 
they know, for example, the daily or monthly bandwidth limits on wireless 
broadband services.”
182 But in fact, there already are multiple information 
resources, including the Internet and consumer surveys, to help consumers make 
decisions in the wireless market. The availability of this information makes any 
disclosure mandate unnecessary. 
Thus, recognizing the power of the Internet to shape opinions, wireless 
operators are quick to respond to anything that could undermine their images. 
Verizon’s recent announcement to phase out the use of the term “unlimited” for 
its data plans is a case in point.
183 Verizon’s terms and conditions of its largest 
data plan now clearly states that using more than 5 GB of bandwidth during the 
course of a month will result in service termination.
184 According to a Verizon 
Wireless spokesman, the 5 BG limitation is not new: “The terms and conditions 
remain the same. We are changing graphically how we explain it to customers 
and providing more information to help customers decide if this is the right plan 
for them.”
185 The announcement is significant because it occurred in the absence 
of regulation. Although proponents of wireless net neutrality may claim that the 
decision was motivated by the threat of regulation, another explanation is that 
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consumer sentiment—likely informed by web postings and surveys—pressured 
Verizon into voluntarily making the disclosure clearer. There is no compelling 
case for imposing an additional layer of regulation for mandatory disclosures, 
which can become inflexible in the face of continuing technological change.
186  
D.  Should the Wireless Industry Work Together to Create Clear and Unified 
Standards for Developers? 
Wu’s final recommendation is that wireless operators adopt uniform 
standards for developers. This could take the form of regulation, but could also 
result from a voluntary agreement. It is not clear that the benefits of embracing a 
single standard outweigh the costs. Again, Wu does not offer any empirical 
evidence on the likely costs and benefits. Given the fact that there are five 
national providers, it may not be difficult to select a standard if the net benefits of 
doing so were large. However, there are clear costs to standardization, one of 
which is that it has the potential to lock in inefficient technologies. We are not 
persuaded based on the evidence that a uniform standard should be required.  
Finally, any proposal for standardization should be cognizant of prior 
attempts to use standards in the industry. The most notable experience was the 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), an example that Wu himself cites in his 
paper:  
 
The carriers, however, supported a different approach, embodied in the WAP 
protocol. As opposed to adapting the Internet to the technical constraints of 
mobile phones, WAP created an entirely new set of protocols, and 
contemplated, in essence, the creation of an alternative, cell-phone only Web. 
The carriers pressured manufacturers to offer WAP-compatible browsers 
only, and then, at least initially, a ‘walled garden’ of WAP-compatible sites. . . 
. Eventually the carriers relented, demanding only that their site be the first 
site available on any browser. Ultimately, WAP proved a commercial failure 
and has been abandoned in the United States.
187 
 
Given what Wu describes as the “commercial failure” of WAP, it is not clear that 
standardizing around a new technology would produce better results. Moreover, 
once they adopt a new standard and make standard-specific investments, the 
operators would again have incentives to “pressure” manufacturers, which Wu 
apparently dislikes. By embracing an inefficient standard, wireless operators 
could undermine innovation at all levels of the network. If experience is any 
guide, standardization for the sake of standardization could decrease social 
welfare. 
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This is the first paper to rigorously analyze the concept of wireless net 
neutrality as defined by Professor Wu. Although it is hard to resist policies that 
allegedly may be associated with the phrase “net neutrality,” when applied to the 
wireless industry, there is a strong economic basis for doing so. Our principal 
conclusion is that the costs of implementing proposals to promote wireless net 
neutrality are likely to exceed the benefits. Given the lack of market power 
among wireless operators, the likelihood that any particular applications provider 
or equipment provider could be foreclosed by the conduct of a single wireless 
network owner is remote.  
Our analysis suggests that technological change occurs at a very rapid rate in 
the highly competitive market for wireless services. We believe that regulators 
should take particular care in regulating such markets. Regulation is typically a 
very crude instrument that could easily do more harm than good if, for example, 
it blunts the incentive for technological innovation. Given the rapid pace of 
innovation in the wireless industry, combined with the rapidly decreasing prices, 
it is hard to imagine that a regulatory elixir could actually improve on the status 
quo. For that reason, Wu’s calls for wireless regulation should be rejected. 
 
 
    
 





APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLES OF WIRELESS APPLICATION INNOVATION, 1999-2006 
 





Allows mobile phones to 
access the Internet.  
Shipped originally by 
Nokia in 1999, the 
“7110.” 





Allows people to answer 
their wireless phones 
from up to 30 feet away.  
Unveiled by Ericsson. 
1999  Fifth CMRS Report, p.48 
Sprint 
Wireless Web 
Nationwide wireless web 
service offering 
connectivity up to 
14.4Kbps through an 
Internet-ready handset. 
1999  Fifth CMRS Report, p.51 
Two-way text 
messaging 
Introduced by T-Mobile 
in the US, Verizon and 
AT&T followed later in 
2000. 
2000  Eighth CMRS Report, ¶144 
Alltel “Web-
Unwired” 
Wireless web services.  2000  Sixth CMRS Report, p.61 
MyBiz 
Interactive 
Cingular and RIM 
Blackberry service that 
offers messaging and e-
mail services. 
2000  Sixth CMRS Report, p.70 
Nextel Online  Wireless Internet service 
offered data speeds up to 
19.2 Kbps for business 
customers.  Partnered 
with Microsoft for access 
to MSN Hotmail, Money, 
and Expedia. 




Allowed subscribers to 
exchange text-messages 
with subscribers in other 
services. 







Operating system for 
phones and PDAs that 
allows establishment of a 
secure VPN connection to 
corporate servers. 
2001  Eighth CMRS Report, ¶167     
 









Services such as AIM and 
MSN Messenger offered 
on mobile devices, 
enabling users to send and 
receive messages from a 
community of users, 
creating a chat-style 
atmosphere, versus the 
one-on-one style of SMS. 
2001  Seventh CMRS Report, p.69 
cdma2001 1X  First phase of 3G 
technology rollout – 
Verizon and Sprint. 
2001  Sixth CMRS Report, p.49 
Enterprise 
Solution 
Arch Wireless product 
that allows employees to 
access firewall protected 
files, e-mail, calendar 
functions, and enterprise 
applications on a variety 
of devices. 
2002  Seventh CMRS Report, p.75 
cdma2000 
1xEV 
Second phase of 3G 
rollout – boosting 
network data speeds up to 
2.4Mbps. 
2002  Sixth CMRS Report, p.49 
MobiTV Real-time  video 
programming service with 
15 cable news, sports, and 
entertainment channels – 
powered by Idetic, Inc., 
which streams the 
programs onto the phones 
via the Internet.  Also 
includes radio channels, 
notable Yankees games. 





Exchange of photo, video, 
animation, and audio files 
using mobile phone. 
2003  Eighth CMRS Report, ¶155 
AT&T 
mMode 
AT&T data service that 
also incorporated 
MobiTV services. 
2004  Tenth CMRS Report, ¶140 
T-Mobile 
CallerTunes 
Allows user to select 
ringtones for caller to 
hear, including 
downloadable songs. 
2004  Press Release, T-Mobile, T-Mobile 
USA Launches CallerTunes; The 
Nationwide Ringback Tone Service 
That Lets Users “Represent Their 
Style,” Dec. 8, 2004. 
Sprint Music 
Store 
Enables purchase and 
downloads of full-length 
songs over a wireless 
telephone network 
directly onto cell phones. 
2005  Eleventh CMRS Report, ¶137    
 




Application Description  Date  Source 
Verizon V 
CAST 
Purchase and download 
full-length songs over a 
wireless telephone 
network directly onto cell 
phones. Access to video 
clips and unlimited 
browsing of Verizon’s 
“Mobile Web” news and 
information service. 
Additionally, 3-D games, 
music videos, and other 
premium channels are 
available payment. 
2005  Eleventh CMRS Report, ¶137 
Cingular 
ROKR 
Cell phone that plays 
songs downloaded from 
Apple iTunes. 
2005  Eleventh CMRS Report, ¶137 
Sprint Power 
Vision 
Package that allows a cell 
phone user to watch TV, 
download songs, receive 
information, and access 
other content at 
broadband-like speeds. 
2005  Eleventh CMRS Report, ¶138 
Sprint TV  Provides specially 
produced short clips from 
major networks. 




3G handsets introduced 
by Verizon that can 
access the EV-DO 
highspeed network.  
Allows use of V CAST 
services. 
2005  Tenth CMRS Report, ¶141 
Sprint EV-
DO 
Sprint rolling out EV-DO 
service to at least 60 
metropolitan, covering 
over 150M people. 
2005  Press Release, Sprint, Sprint 
Begins Launch of EV-DO Wireless 




Mobile access to Yahoo 
multiplayer games.  
Allows playing of 
multiplayer games such as 
poker or chess against 
users on PCs or other 
mobile handsets. 
2005  Press Release, Sprint, Yahoo! And 
Sprint Team to Offer Multiplayer 
PC-to-Mobile Games, May 16, 
2006. 
Axcess Web  Wireless Web service 
introduced by Alltel that 
allows quick access to the 
latest weather, news, and 
sports. 
2005  Press Release, Alltel, Alltel 
Introduces New Web Service for 
Wireless Customers, Jan. 4, 2005. 
Cingular 
Video 
Watch video clips of 
television shows, sports, 
news, weather, and other 
content on advanced 
handsets. 
2006  Eleventh CMRS Report, ¶138     
 




Application Description  Date  Source 
ESPN Mobile  Sports news and 
information services 
running on an EV-DO 
network with capacity 
leased from Sprint. 
2006  Eleventh CMRS Report, ¶138 
Helio  Service to bring advanced 
cellphone technology to 
the US, bringing games, 
video clips, and other 
forms of entertainment. 
2006  Eleventh CMRS Report, ¶138 
YouTube 
services 
Select video content from 
YouTube will be 
allowable on Verizon 
handsets. 
2006  Mark Rockwell, Verizon Goes 





introduced GPS tracking 
services for mobile 
handsets.  Mologogo is 
one such application 
developed that works on 
Nextel handsets. 
2006  Daniel Charles, GPS is Smartening 
Up Your Cell Phone, NPR – 
Technology, Sep. 25, 2006. 
Smarter 
Agent 
Service that utilizes GPS 
and mobile handsets to 
assist in real estate sales 
by showing houses for 
sale on a users handset. 
2006  Daniel Charles, GPS is Smartening 
Up Your Cell Phone, NPR – 
Technology, Sep. 25, 2006. 
Sprint EV-
DO Update 
By year end 2006, Sprint 
EV-DO network covered 
more than 188M people 
and 8,700 cities.  Average 
download speeds 
increased to 450-800 
Kbps. 
2006  Press Release, Sprint, Sprint Sets 
Sights on 2007 After Continuing to 
“Power Up” Networks in 2006, 
Dec. 20, 2006. 
Gmail Mobile  Gmail, the popular e-mail 
service offered by 
Google, will be available 
on Sprint handsets. 
2006  Press Release, Sprint, Sprint and 
Google Team to Offer New Gmail 




sports and entertainment 
video programming 
network for mobile 
devices. 
2006 Press  Release,  Sprint, Sprint Power 
View Launches Today: Free, First-
of-its-Kind, Made-for-Mobile 
Sports/Entertainment Programming 
Network, Sep. 12, 2006. 
Sprint Movies  First “pay-per-view” 
service that streams full 
length movies onto 
mobile handsets. 
2006  Press Release, Sprint, Sprint is 
First to Offer Full-Length “Pay-
Per-View” Movies on Mobile 
Phones in the US, Sep. 9, 2006. 
BiM 
Interactive 
Fitness application that 
uses GPS-enabled Sprint 
phones for feedback for 
runners, walkers, and 
cyclists involving 
2006  Press Release, Sprint, Sprint and 
Bones in Motion Launch Mobile 
Fitness Application, Feb. 2, 2006.    
 




Application Description  Date  Source 
performance summaries, 
maps, and more. 
Cingular 3G 
Coverage 
Cingular 3G Mobile 
Broadband network now 
services over 160 
markets, including most 
of the top 100 major cities 
in the US. 
2006  Press Release, Cingular, Cingular 
3G Coverage in More than 160 
Markets, Dec. 20, 2006. 
TeleNav GPS 
Navigator 
Allows GPS navigation 
with a “birds-eye view” 
moving map.  PDA-based 
and first offered by 
Cingular. 
2006  Press Release, Cingular, Cingular 
Unveils PDA-Based Wireless GPS 
Navigation System with 3D 
Moving Maps, Nov. 20, 2006. 
Pocket 
Express 
Application that delivers 
news, sports, weather, 
stock quotes, street maps, 
directions, and more for 
smart phones. 
2006  Press Release, Alltel, Alltell 
Wireless Offers Handmark Pocket 




XM Radio available 
through Alltel handsets.  
Application developed by 
MobiTV. 
2006  Press Release, Alltel, Alltel 
Wireless First US Carrier to 





Business customers will 
be able to track their 
vehicles and other 
equipment using GPS 
technology and Alltel 
handsets. 
2006  Press Release, Alltel, Alltel Offers 
Wireless GPS Vehicle Tracking for 




First “true” mobile TV 
service, with streaming 
content. 
2007  Press Release, Verizon Wireless, 
Verizon Revolutionizes TV at 
Home and On Mobile Phones, Jan. 
7, 2007. 
Sprint iX-3  GPS-technology that 
allows real-time tracking 
of school busses. 
2007  Press Release, Sprint, Sprint 
Certifies New GPS-Based School 





Verizon Wireless now 
offers service where the 
TiVO DVR box can be 
programmed from a 
mobile handset. 
2007  Verizon Wireless, TiVo Connect 
for Mobile Program Scheduling, 
CTIA SmartBrief, Mar. 16, 2007. 
AskMeNow  Intelligent mobile search, 
with the ability to ask 
questions and quickly 
receive answers via 
mobile handset. Alltel is 
first US carrier to 
introduce this service. 
2007  Press Release, Alltel, Alltel 
Wireless First US Carrier to Offer 
AskMeNow Across All Handsets, 
Mar. 1, 2007. 
 